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ABSTRACT
Arbitration in securities industry-sponsored forums is the primary mechanism
to resolve disputes between investors and their brokerage firms. Because it is
mandatory, participants debate its fairness, and Congress has introduced legisla-
tion to ban pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements. Missing from
the debate has been empirical research of perceptions of fairness by the partici-
pants, especially investors. To fill that gap, we mailed 25,000 surveys to partici-
pants in recent securities arbitrations involving customers to learn their views of
the process. The article first details the survey's background, explains the impor-
tance of surveying perceptions of fairness, and describes our methodologies, pro-
cedures, and survey error structure. We then present our findings, including our
primary conclusions that (1) investors have a far more negative perception of se-
curities arbitration than all other participants, (2) investors have a strong negative
perception of the bias of arbitrators, and (3) investors lack knowledge of the secur-
ities arbitration process. We also offer several explanations for these negative
perceptions. We conclude that customers' negative perceptions transform the
reality faced by policy-makers and mandate reform of the process, including the
elimination of the industry arbitrator requirement and further public deliberation
on the value of the explained award.
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, arbitration in forums sponsored by the securities in-
dustry' has been the primary mechanism 2 for the resolution of disputes among
1. Until mid-2007, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the New
York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") ran separate arbitration forums that handled a combined 99% of all
securities arbitrations in the country. On July 30, 2007, NASD and NYSE Regulation, including their
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investors, brokerage firms and brokers.3 If, as an example, a customer believes
that her broker made misrepresentations or recommended an investment that was
unsuitable for her financial situation and objectives, 4 she would be required, be-
cause of the arbitration clause in her customer's agreement, to arbitrate her claim
in the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA") arbitration forum.
As a result of the virtually mandatory nature of the process,5 participants have
debated its fairness despite numerous improvements over the years. Many inves-
tor advocates argue that securities arbitration is unfair, inefficient, expensive, and
biased towards the securities industry.6 The securities industry, on the other hand,
contends that the arbitration process works well, is faster and less expensive than
litigation, and is fair to all the parties involved.7
The United States Congress has taken a recent interest in securities arbitra-
tion. In July 2007, both Houses introduced legislation to declare unenforceable
pre-dispute arbitration agreements ("PDAAs") in consumer contracts.8 Senator
Russ Feingold, the bill's sponsor in the Senate, expressly stated that the proposed
Arbitration Fairness Act would apply to PDAAs in securities customers' account
respective arbitration forums, consolidated and formed the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority
("FINRA"). Press Release, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority - FINRA (July 30, 2007), available at
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P036329. FINRA now operates the largest dis-
pute resolution forum in the securities industry. FINRA, What is Dispute Resolution?,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/index.htm (follow "What is Dispute Resolution?") (last
visited Nov. 17, 2008).
2. Mediation is also utilized if all parties consent. See Jill I. Gross, Securities Mediation: Dispute
Resolution for the Individual Investor, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 329, 359 (2006).
3. In the late 1980s, the Supreme Court overruled prior law, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953),
and held that brokerage firms could enforce pre-dispute arbitration agreements in brokerage account
customer agreements even as to federal securities claims. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,485 (1989); Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987).
4. For a description of the most common claims brought by customers against their brokers, see
Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along: The Role of Law in Securities Arbitra-
tion, 23 CARDOZO L. REv. 991, 1008-1012 (2002).
5. A Review of the Sees. Arbitration Sys.: Hearing before the U.S. H. Subcomm. on Capital Mar-
kets, Ins. and Gov't Sponsored Enterprises, 109th Cong. 13-14 (Mar. 17, 2005) [hereinafter 2005
Hearing], available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/archivethearings.asp@formmode=detail&hearing=362.html (state-
ment of Constantine Katsoris, Wilkinson Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law) (testi-
fying that McMahon "virtually transformed" securities arbitration "from a voluntary procedure to a
mandatory one").
6. See The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S.1782 Before the S. Comm. on the Con-
stitution, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Senate Subcommittee Hearing] (statement of the Public
Investor Arbitration Bar Association ("PIABA") in connection with the Senate Committee's Review of
the arbitration system); Mark A. Tepper, Survey Says - SRO Arbitration Unfair, 12 PIABA BAR J. 11
(Sprint 2005) , available at http://www.marktepper.comlarticles/24/piabalawjournal_spring_-2005;
Charles Gasparino, Judging Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 6, 2004, at 56; Gary Weiss and David
Serchuk, Walled Off From Justice?, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 22, 2004, at 91; Richard Karp, Hardball,
BARRON'S, Oct. 20, 2003, at 36. See generally Edward Brunet & Jennifer Johnson, Substantive Fair-
ness in Securities Arbitration, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 459 (2008); Jennifer Johnson, Wall Street Meets the
Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N.C. L. REv. 123 (2005).
7. See Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association ("SIFMA"), White Paper on Arbitra-
tion in the Securities Industry (2007), http://www.sifma.org/regulatorylpdf/arbitration-white-paper.pdf
[hereinafter SIFMA White Paper]. SIFMA "represents the industry which powers the global economy"
and has more than 650 member firms. SIFMA, Welcome to SIFMA.org,
http://www.sifma.org/about/about.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
8. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 3010, 110th Cong. (2007).
No. 21
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agreements. 9 Shortly before introducing the legislation, Senator Feingold and
Senator Patrick Leahy had written to Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") Chairman Christopher Cox urging the SEC to enact a rule banning man-
datory arbitration clauses from broker-dealers' customer agreements.' 0 Both Se-
nate and House subcommittees held hearings on the proposed legislation in
2007,11 and a critic of the current securities arbitration process testified at each of
them. 12 Previously, in March 2005, a subcommittee of the House of Representa-
tives Financial Services Committee held a hearing to better understand how the
securities arbitration process was working and whether any reforms were
needed.13 At that hearing, witnesses with expertise in securities arbitration testi-
fied about, and disagreed on the ramifications of, many aspects of the process,
including (1) its mandatory nature,14 (2) the inclusion of one industry arbitrator on
every three-arbitrator panel,' 5 and (3) a lack of transparency in arbitrators' deci-
sions.' 6
9. Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 6 (opening statement of Sen. Russell Feingold).
"First, [the Act] is intended to cover disputes between investors and securities brokers. I believe that
such disputes are covered by the definition of consumer disputes, but to clear up any uncertainty, we
will make the intent even clearer when we mark up the bill in committee." Id.
10. Letter from Senator Russell D. Feingold & Patrick Leahy, Chairman, Committee on the Judi-
ciary, U.S. Senate, to Christopher Cox, Chairman, SEC (May 4, 2007) (on file with author). See also
Gretchen Morgenson, Dear S.E.C., Reconsider Arbitration, N.Y. TtMES, May 6, 2007, § 3, at 1.
11. Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 6; Hearing on "H.R. 3010, The Arbitration Fairness
Act of 2007" before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law, 110th Cong. (2007)
[hereinafter House Subcommittee Hearing].
12. See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 6 (statement of Tanya Solov, representing the
North American Securities Administrators Association [NASAA]); House Subcommittee Hearing,
supra note 11 (statement of Theodore G. Eppenstein, Testimony in Support of Prohibiting Mandatory
Arbitration in Securities Cases).
13. See 2005 Hearing, supra note 5.
14. Id. To open an account with virtually any broker-dealer, investors must sign an agreement that
contains a clause requiring them to settle any disputes in arbitration. This clause is regulated, both in
form and content, by FINRA Rules. See NASD CONDUCT RULE 3110(f).
15. At FINRA, if the claim is more than $50,000, the arbitration panel generally consists of three
arbitrators. NASD CODE OF ARBITRATION PROCEDURE FOR CUSTOMER DISPUTES 12401(c) (2008),
available at
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display-main.html?rbid=1189&element-id=1159006702 (follow
"PROCEDURAL RULES (8000-14000)") [hereinafter CUSTOMER CODE]. A three-person arbitration
panel consists of one non-public arbitrator, customarily referred to as an industry arbitrator, and two
public arbitrators, or arbitrators who are not associated with the securities or commodities industry.
CUSTOMER CODE 12402(b). The definitions of non-public and public arbitrators have engendered
considerable debate in recent years, as FINRA has tightened the definition of who can be considered a
public arbitrator. The industry arbitrator includes individuals who have been associated within the past
five years with, or who are retired from, the securities or commodities industry and professionals who
have devoted at least 20% of their professional work in the past two years to clients in the securities
and commodities industry. CUSTOMER CODE 12100(p). An individual who does not meet the definition
of non-public arbitrator may, nevertheless, be outside the definition of a public arbitrator under
CUSTOMER CODE 12100(u), and thus be ineligible to serve as an arbitrator, even if otherwise qualified.
Investor advocates contend that the industry arbitrator "presents an appearance of bias and impropriety
to the investing public," 2005 Hearing, supra note 5, at 105 (statement of PIABA), while the securities
industry asserts that industry arbitrators provide valuable expertise. SIFMA White Paper, supra note 7,
at 36.
16. FINRA publicly discloses arbitration awards and during the arbitrator-selection process provides
information on an arbitrator's past awards, but arbitrators are not required to explain the award or their
reasoning. See 2005 Hearing, supra note 5, at 34-35, 37 (statement of Linda D. Fienberg, President,
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc.). FINRA's proposal to require arbitrators to include an explanation for
[Vol. 2008
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We both have written frequently on securities arbitration 7 and have con-
cluded that the process is fair, when measured against hallmarks of procedural
fairness.1 8 Our assessments were based on our analysis of the rules and practices
of the forum and our own experiences with the process, both as investors' repre-
sentatives and as arbitrators. Missing from our assessment was empirical data
about the perceptions of fairness by the participants themselves, especially inves-
tors who, although they are required to arbitrate their claims, are the least know-
ledgeable of the process among the participants directly impacted by the arbitra-
tors' decisions.
In recent years, only a few researchers have conducted empirical studies of
securities arbitration, and none of them focused on perceptions of fairness. 19 The
most recent attempt to measure party satisfaction with securities arbitration dates
back to 1999, before numerous rule changes had altered the process. 20 There was
no recent reliable information about how participants viewed their experience,
and, in particular, whether investors viewed the arbitration process as fair. As a
result, when the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration ("SICA")2l sought
to sponsor a new empirical study, we leaped at the opportunity.
their awards at the request of the customer languished in the rule-making process. Written Explana-
tions in Arbitration Awards Upon the Request of Customers or Associated Persons in Industry Contro-
versies, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,065 (proposed July 11, 2005) (withdrawn Oct. 14, 2008, and replaced by
FINRA, Notice of Filing Proposed Rule Change Relating to Amendments to the Code of Arbitration
Procedure to Require Arbitrators to Provide an Explained Decision Upon the Jouint Request of the
Parties, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,995 (Oct. 27, 2008)). For a more detailed analysis of the benefits and draw-
backs of this rule proposal, see Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, The Explained Award of Damocles:
Protection or Peril in Securities Arbitration, 34 SEC. REG. L.J. 17 (2006) [hereinafter Explained Award
of Damocles].
17. See, e.g., Explained Award of Damocles, supra note 16; Jill 1. Gross & Ronald Filante, Ph.D,
Developing A Law/Business Collaboration through Pace's Securities Arbitration Clinic, 11 FORDHAM
J. CoRP. & FIN. L. 57 (2005); Barbara Black, The Irony of Securities Arbitration Today: Why Do
Brokerage Firms Need Judicial Protection?, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 415 (2003); Barbara Black & Jill I.
Gross, Economic Suicide: The Collision of Ethics and Risk in Securities Law, 64 U. Prrr. L. REV. 483
(2003) [hereinafter Economic Suicide]; Barbara Black & Jill I. Gross, Making It Up As They Go Along:
The Role of Law in Securities Arbitration, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 991, 999-1005 (2002) [hereinafter
Making it Up].
18. See Jill Gross, McMahon Turns Twenty: The Regulation of Fairness in Securities Arbitration, 76
U. CIN. L. REV. 493, 518 (2008); Barbara Black, Is Securities Arbitration Fair to Investors?, 25 PACE
L. REV. 1 (2004).
19. We describe these studies in Part V(G), infra. There are also empirical studies that focus on
other forms of arbitration. One that deals specifically with perceptions is Harris Interactive Survey,
Arbitration: Simpler, Cheaper, and Faster Than Litigation (Apr. 2005),
http://www.adrforum.com/rcontrolldocuments/ResearchStudiesAndStatistics2005HarrisPoll.pdf
(conducted on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Institute for Legal Reform, this survey inter-
viewed 609 individuals and found general satisfaction with arbitration).
20. Gary Tidwell, Kevin Foster & Michael Hummel, Party Evaluations of Arbitrators: An Analysis
of Data Collected from NASD Regulation Arbitrations (Aug. 5, 1999),
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/med-arb/documentstmediation-arbitration/pO09528.pdf (concluding
that both parties to the arbitration process found arbitrators, and the process itself, to be fair and un-
biased) [hereinafter Tidwell Report].
21. SICA includes representatives from FINRA, SIFMA, and the public. See Constantine N. Katso-
ris, SICA: The First Twenty Years, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 483, 488-90 (1996) (setting forth the back-
ground on the creation of SICA).
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This Article, based on our Report to SICA dated February 6, 2008,22 analyzes
the results of our mailed survey of participants' perceptions of fairness of securi-
23ties Self-Regulatory Organization ("SRO") arbitrations involving customers.
Part II of this Article details the background of the survey and explains the impor-
tance of surveying perceptions of fairness of a dispute resolution process. Part III
describes the methodologies and procedures we implemented to design and con-
duct the survey, including the error structure potentially contained in our metho-
dologies. Part IV contains our findings. In Part V we present our analysis of the
findings, including our primary conclusions that (1) investors have a far more
negative perception of securities arbitration than all other participants, (2) inves-
tors have a strong negative perception of the bias of arbitrators in the securities
arbitration forum, and (3) investors lack knowledge of the securities arbitration
process. We also offer several explanations for these negative perceptions. We
conclude in Part VI by noting the implications of the findings, primarily the new
reality that Congress, the SEC and FINRA must face that customers' negative
perceptions mandate reform of the securities arbitration process. Specifically,
because we continue to believe that securities arbitration is a better alternative
than litigation, we are not persuaded at this time that Congress or the SEC should
declare PDAAs unenforceable in customers' account agreements with their bro-
kerage firms. We do urge that serious consideration be given to eliminating the
requirement of an industry arbitrator on every three-person arbitration panel.
While we are less convinced about the investor protection value of an explained
award, our survey findings necessitate further public discussion and debate on
FINRA's proposal to increase the transparency of securities arbitration awards.
At a bare minimum, the survey findings clearly highlight the need for all consti-
tuencies to step up their efforts to educate investors as to the securities arbitration
process. If reforms are not made, Congressional action may well be warranted.
H. SURVEYING PERCEPTIONS
A. Background
In 2002, the State of California and the SROs were engaged in litigation over
the state's attempt to impose its conflict disclosure standards on arbitrators in SRO
securities arbitrations. 24 The SEC25 filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the
22. Jill Gross & Barbara Black, Perceptions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration: An Empirical
Study, Report to the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter SICA
Report], available at http://www.law.pace.edu/files/finalreporttosica.pdf. SICA sponsored the study,
and FINRA paid for it.
23. For purposes of this study, SRO arbitrations include customer-initiated arbitrations at NASD
Dispute Resolution and the New York Stock Exchange filed from January 1, 2002, through Dec. 3 1,
2006, and closed between Jan. 1, 2005, and Dec. 31, 2006. See infra, Part Ill (B).
24. See NASD Disp. Resol., Inc. v. Jud. Council of Cal., 488 F.3d 1065 (9th Cir. 2007) (dismissing
appeal because of mootness and vacating district court's judgment). See also Credit Suisse First Bos-
ton Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that federal securities law preempted
the California standards in the context of SROs); Jevne v. Super. Ct., IlI P.3d 954 (2005) (to same
effect).
25. The SEC has oversight authority over SRO securities arbitration pursuant to Section 19(b) of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 34 Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b), which requires SEC approval
[Vol. 2008
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SROs' position that federal regulation preempted state standards and also re-
quested that Professor Michael A. Perino26 assess the adequacy of the current SRO
arbitrator disclosure requirements. 27 In the resulting report ("the Perino Report"),
Professor Perino concluded that the disclosure rules appeared to be adequate. He
went on to observe that any "lingering perceptions of pro-industry bias" relate to
"panel composition, not the presence of undisclosed arbitrator conflicts., 28  He
further noted that, while empirical evidence was limited, past surveys seemed to
suggest that parties involved in SRO arbitrations find that arbitrators are fair and
impartial.2 9 However, because of "lingering concerns about pro-industry bias"
and the insufficient amount of empirical evidence addressing investors' percep-
tions of the securities arbitration process, Professor Perino recommended that the
"SROs sponsor additional independent studies to further evaluate the impartiality
of the SRO arbitration process."
30
In response to this recommendation, NASD asked SICA to conduct a study of
participants' perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration. On October 5,
2003, SICA disseminated a Request for Proposal seeking vendors interested in
conducting the recommended study. In 2004, we submitted a proposal to design a
survey to investigate the fairness of SRO arbitrations to the individual investor,
focusing on an assessment of (1) investors' perceptions of fairness of the SRO
arbitration process; (2) whether arbitrators appear competent to resolve investors'
disputes with their broker-dealers; (3) investors' perceptions of fairness of SRO
arbitration as compared to their perceptions of fairness in securities litigation in
similar disputes; and (4) whether the outcome of arbitrations appears fair to the
parties. SICA accepted this proposal and, on August 22, 2005, formally retained
us to conduct the recommended study.
B. The Importance of Perceptions of Fairness
Academic literature confirms the importance of surveying perceptions of fair-
ness of a dispute resolution forum. 31 These perceptions are important because the
of any changes to the SRO securities arbitration rules. The SEC is required to find that any proposed
change is "consistent with the requirements of [the 34 Act] and the rules and regulations thereunder,"
including the requirement that the rule protect investors and be in the public interest . Id. § 78s(b)(2).
26. Dean George W. Matheson Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
27. See Michael Perino, Report to the Securities and Exchange Commission Regarding Arbitrator
Conflict Disclosure Requirements in NASD and NYSE Securities Arbitration at 3 (Nov. 4, 2002),
available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/arbconflict.pdf [hereinafter Perino Report].
28. Id.
29. Id. at 30. The Perino Report primarily was referring to two GAO studies (see Securities Arbitra-
tion: How Investors Fare, GEN. AccT. OFF., REP. NO. GGD-92-71 (1992) (finding that statistical
results from industry-sponsored and independent forums did not show any indication of a pro-industry
bias in arbitration decisions at industry-sponsored forums); Securities Arbitration: Actions Needed to
Address Problem of Unpaid Award, GEN. ACCT. OFF., REP. No. GGD-00-1 15 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
GAO Report] (stating that there was no basis to make any conclusions about the fairness of SRO arbi-
tration proceedings, because the small caseloads at alternative forums did not allow for meaningful
comparisons)), and NASD's Tidwell Report, supra note 20. See generally id.
30. Id. at 37.
31. See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, ADR Is Here: Preliminary Reflections on Where It Fits In A System
of Justice, 3 NEV. L. J. 289, 297-98 (2003) [hereinafter ADR Is Here] (stating that the "subjective
perception of fairness is critical, because even assuming objective fairness, the system could not func-
tion well if it were perceived to be unfair or unjust").
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substantive (or distributive) fairness of a dispute resolution process 32 cannot readi-
ly be measured, especially when the process is confidential and outcomes are not
transparent, as is the case in securities arbitration because awards do not typically
contain an explanation or reasons.
Dispute resolution scholars recently have focused on procedural justice as a
more accessible predictor than substantive justice of parties' assessment of the
overall fairness of a process.33 These scholars have found that perceptions of
procedural fairness strongly impact perceptions of substantive fairness, which
results in a greater willingness to comply with the outcome and greater trust in and
respect for the decision-maker. 34 Summarizing prior research by social psycholo-
gists, a leading scholar of procedural justice writes that "people who believe that
they have been treated in a procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude
that the resulting outcome is substantively fair, even if that outcome is unfavora-
ble. 35 She posits that four key elements "reliably lead people to conclude that a
dispute resolution process is procedurally fair": (1) the process provides an oppor-
tunity for disputants to voice their concerns to a third party; (2) the disputants
perceive that the third party actually considered these concerns; (3) the disputants
perceive that the third party treated them in an "even-handed" way; and (4) the
disputants feel that they were treated in a dignified and respectful manner.
36
Our survey asked participants about their most recent experience with the
SRO arbitration process, including their perceptions about the attentiveness, com-
petence and impartiality of the arbitrators, as well as their satisfaction with the
32. A process is substantively fair if equally situated disputants receive equal outcomes. See Jean R.
Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 15 STAN. L. REV. 1637, 1666 (2005) [herei-
nafter Creeping Mandatory Arbitration] (defining substantive, or distributive, justice and stating that
"if a single party or group were to win all disputes, if equally situated persons received disparate re-
suits, or if the 'justice' system led to increasingly unequal division of resources, few if any of us would
feel that justice had been served").
33. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181 (2004) (theorizing impor-
tance of procedural justice for legitimacy of dispute resolution processes); Stemlight, ADR Is Here,
supra note 31, at 297.
34. See, e.g., Susan Franck, Integrating Investment Treaty Conflict and Dispute System Design, 92
MINN. L. REV. 161 (2007):
Empirical evidence suggests that when stakeholders believe a system is procedurally just, they
are more likely to buy into the result and the process, comply with the outcome, comply with the
law in the future, increase commitment to the organization, accord respect and loyalty to the in-
stitution, and perceive the system to be legitimate.
Id. at 214-15; Nancy Welsh, Perceptions of Fairness, in THE NEGOTIATOR'S FIELDBOOK 165, 170
(Andrea K. Schneider & Christopher Honeyman eds., 2006); Deborah R. Hensler, Judging Arbitration:
The Findings of Procedural Justice Research, in AAA HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
41-49 (Thomas E. Carbonneau & Jeanette A. Jaeggi eds., 2006); Stemlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration, supra note 32, at 1666-67 (citing studies).
35. Welsh, supra note 34, at 170; see also Hensler, supra note 34, at 48 (stating that "arbitration
litigants will be satisfied with arbitration if they think the process is fair and will be dissatisfied if they
think the process is unfair").
36. Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and
Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL ED. 49, 52 (2004) (citing Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in
Court-Connected Mediation: What's Justice Got to Do With It?, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 787 (2001)); see
also Hensler, supra note 34, at 48:
[Alny assessments of the procedural fairness of arbitration by arbitration litigants will depend on
several variables: whether they are allowed to participate in, or at least observe, the process firs-
thand; and whether they believe the arbitrator is unbiased, gave fair consideration to their evi-
dence, treated all parties equally, and treated them in a dignified fashion.
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outcome. We also asked, more generally, about their opinion of the securities
arbitration process. From the survey, we gain valuable insights about procedural
and substantive fairness in securities arbitration cases as experienced by the sur-
vey participants.
HI. METHODOLOGIES AND PROCEDURES
A. Survey Development and Design
37
In late 2004, we began developing the survey and determined that the most
effective way to gather responses from all participants38 would be to disseminate a
paper survey by mail.39 Mail surveys offer the following advantages: (1) they
require fewer resources than telephone surveys; (2) they provide a sense of priva-
cy to the survey participant; and (3) they are less sensitive to bias introduced by
interviewers. 40 We considered and weighed these advantages against some disad-
vantages: (1) risk of non-coverage error (i.e., the database of recipients is flawed);
(2) risk of non-response error (i.e., those who respond are different from those
who do not respond in a substantive way that affects the survey results); (3) lack
of control over who within the household responds; and (4) risk that survey partic-
ipants may not fill out the questionnaire completely. 41
Early on we retained the services of Cornell University's Survey Research In-
stitute ("SRI") 42 to provide us with survey design and implementation expertise,
and, with SRI's input, we drafted questions for the mail survey. We included four
types of questions: (1) questions requiring a binary response (e.g., "yes" or "no"),
(2) categorical questions (requiring a response from a list of viable options), (3)
Likert scale questions (statements that could be answered by a range of responses,
such as strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disag-
ree, don't know), and (4) one open-ended question-the state in which a hearing
was scheduled to take place-to study any possible variations among geographic
regions.
Within the Likert scale section, we varied the orientation of the statements to
include both negative and positive statements. For example, question 16 asked
survey participants to agree or disagree with the statement: "The arbitration panel
appeared competent to resolve the dispute." In contrast, question 17 asked survey
participants to agree or disagree with the statement: 'The arbitration panel did not
understand the issues involved in the case." This type of contrast helps to ensure
37. For a more detailed description, see SICA Report, supra note 22.
38. While our initial proposal contemplated surveying investors only, SICA instructed us to survey
all process participants, including investors, securities industry representatives, and lawyers.
39. We determined that an Internet-based or telephone survey would not be feasible, primarily
because NASD and NYSE did not maintain sufficiently complete databases of e-mail addresses and
telephone numbers for investors who filed arbitration claims.
40. PRIsctLLA SALANT & DON A. DiLLMAN, How TO CONDUCT YOUR OWN SURVEY 35-36 (Wiley
1994).
41. Id. at 36-37.
42. Since 1996, SRI has been providing survey research, data collection, and analysis services to a
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that the participants were paying attention to the statements and also maintains the
neutrality of the survey.
We instructed survey participants who had been involved in more than one
customer dispute that was filed for arbitration to focus on their experiences in
their most recent dispute, to minimize survey participants' reliance on more gene-
ralized impressions that can yield unreliable data that is subject to "recall bias" or
the tendency to exaggerate the consistency between present attitudes and past
experiences.4 3 While SICA initially expressed a preference for gathering survey
participants' impressions based on numerous experiences, we explained that, to
minimize recall bias, it was important to avoid asking people about their impres-
sions. Also, we wanted this study, to the extent possible, to gather "information"
rather than "impressions," as impressions are influenced or confounded by other
factors for which a survey instrument cannot accurately control. Moreover, the
law of averages shows that a "terrible" recent experience reported by one survey
participant will smooth out against a "great" recent experience reported by another
survey participant. It was our view that survey data would be far more reliable
and scientifically accurate if we directed survey participants to focus on their most
recent experience. Ultimately, SICA agreed with our recommendation. We did,
however, conclude the survey with a series of questions that asked more generally
for participants' opinions about the securities arbitration process.
44
B. Survey Recipients
Simultaneously with survey development, we identified the parameters of the
target survey recipients. Both arbitration forums could generate a database of all
parties and their representatives who had participated in a customer-member arbi-
tration and had provided their contact information for a number of past years. Our
objective was to generate contacts from two years of recently closed cases, which
we estimated to be a manageable and representative population, but we also
wanted to exclude cases that were filed earlier than five years ago and thus were
administered before numerous rule changes went into effect.
We determined that we would send out surveys to the following subset of in-
dividuals:
43. Research around memory bias reveals that personal recall of retrospective questions is a function
of past and present experiences. The typical finding is that people exaggerate the consistency between
their present (new) attitudes and their past opinions. Furthermore, people tend to bias their memories
of previously held attributes in ways that deny changes that have actually taken place or overstate
them. The literature concludes that there are two forms of systematic bias in personal memories: (1)
people will exaggerate their consistency over time and incorrectly recall events, tending to recall past
events consistent with current events, or (2) people will overestimate the extent to which their past
memories differ from current experiences (sometimes a prominent/extreme event occurred in the past
overshadows all other events in the past). See generally J.M. TANUR, QUESTIONS ABOUT QUESTIONS
(Russell Sage Foundation, 1991); LinChiat Chang & Jon A. Krosnick, Measuring the Frequency of
Regular Behaviors: Comparing the "Typical Week" to the "Past Week, " 33 SOC. METHODOLOGY 55
(2003); S. SUDMAN & N.M. BRADBURN, RESPONSE EFFEcTs IN SURVEYS (Aldine 1974).
44. Our proposal, as accepted by SICA, contemplated that we would conduct follow-up telephone
interviews with those survey participants who indicated a willingness to be interviewed. SICA later
decided, however, that we would not conduct telephone interviews.
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Contacts listed for all customer arbitrations filed at the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the New York Stock Ex-
change ("NYSE") not earlier than January 1, 2002 and closed between
January 1, 2005 and December 31, 2006;
(1) Including contacts that were: on the case when it closed, removed
due to a bankruptcy order or other court order, or dismissed by arbitra-
tor(s); and
(2) Excluding contacts from cases in which the initial pleading was not
served (e.g., cases that were closed before service because a deficiency
was not cured).
NASD and NYSE generated a combined database of 29,993 contacts to re-
ceive the survey. Pace University-with logistical assistance from NASD and
NYSE-mailed out the survey between March and July 2007. SRI, under the
supervision of Director Yasamin Miller, received and processed results from April
to August 2007. Through August 31, 2007, when data collection closed, SRI
received and processed 3,087 responses. This reflects a thirteen percent (13.0%)
response rate45 based on those surveys effectively mailed out to a contact,46 which
is in line with typical response rates ranging from eight to twelve percent obtained
from a one-time mailing of a survey.
47
C. Error Structure
It is widely recognized that several sources of error can impact the quality of
survey data. It is also accepted practice for survey researchers to disclose the
potential error structure in their surveys. Our survey is subject to two possible
sources of error: coverage error and non-response error.
1. Coverage error. The survey is subject to some coverage error, or the risk
that the results are not reliable because not all members of the population (NASD
or NYSE arbitration participants during a five-year time period) have an equal
chance of being surveyed. As described above,48 we designed parameters for
selecting a population of cases that originated on or after January 1, 2002 (but
eliminating arbitration participants in cases that had not yet closed). The contacts
database generated by our parameters was incomplete because the forums do not
45. Although we conservatively report 13% as the scientifically supported response rate, we firmly
believe that the actual rate is much higher, due to additional duplicates surely present on the mailing
database but not officially eliminated from the total recipient count. Due to the effort it would require
to eliminate those duplicates, we chose not to devote the time.
46. Of the 29,993 contacts, 4,710 surveys were either returned to SRI or otherwise not deliverable
due to insufficient address. Thus, we effectively mailed out a total of 25,283 surveys. We subsequently
determined that at least 1,500 of those contacts were duplicates. Thus, at most, 23,783 contacts had the
opportunity to participate in the survey.
47. This range is derived from SRI's experience over twenty years as well as the experience of other
prominent survey research organizations.
48. For further discussion of the parameters, see supra, Part Ill (B).
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require the parties to provide an address if they have a representative. Therefore,
many party addresses were missing or otherwise undeliverable.
In addition, the database contained duplications for several reasons. First, en-
tries for certain contacts appeared multiple times if the data entered was just
slightly different. While the forums electronically reviewed the database to mi-
nimize the duplicates, they could not ensure that no contact received a duplicate
survey. 49 Second, if a firm and one of its subsidiaries were listed as parties, the
forums could not limit the database to just the firm, resulting in certain firms with
multiple listings. Third, in situations where there were multiple parties with simi-
lar names and the same address, there were multiple rows in the report. An exam-
ple might be an individual, an IRA, and a Trust all entered as separate parties.
2. Non-response bias. Non-response bias is the risk that the respondents'
answers do not accurately reflect the opinions of the people who did not respond.
Because 13.0% of those who received a survey actually responded, our findings
are potentially limited by this non-response error.
The preferred method to test for non-response bias is to conduct telephone in-
terviews of a random sample of contacts who did not respond to measure whether
their answers to the survey questions are statistically significantly different from
the survey participants. While we recommended conducting such a follow-up
study, due to time and resource constraints, SICA did not endorse that recommen-
dation. As a result, we cannot state with certainty whether there is, in fact, any
non-response bias in the survey data.
However, recent survey literature indicates that low response rates do not
necessarily lead to high non-response bias.5 ° At a recent national workshop on
non-response bias, Robert M. Groves, Professor of Sociology and Director of the
Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan and a leading scholar of
survey research, argued that "a narrow focus on response rates has likely been
leading researchers astray from the more fundamental driver of non-response bi-
as-a relationship between the propensity of a household to respond and the value
of that household on a given survey measure., 51 Groves used a meta-analysis of
non-response studies to provide empirical support for this argument. Among his
main conclusions are that (1) "response rate is a poor indicator of non-response
bias," and (2) more variation in non-response bias exists within surveys (among
different questions in the same survey) than exists among different surveys with
49. As described supra note 46, there were at least 1,500 duplicates.
50. See, e.g., Robert M. Groves, Nonresponse Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Household Surveys,
70 PUB. OPINION Q. 646, (Special Issue 2006) (emphasis added) ("[T]here is little empirical support
for the notion that low response rate surveys de facto produce estimates with high nonresponse bias.");
John Rogers, Do Response Rates Matter in RDD Telephone Survey?, Public Research Institute, Theory
and Method, available at http://pri.sfsu.edulcomer.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2008) ("he continued
development of research on nonresponse bias provides comforting news in that RDD surveys can still
provide surprisingly accurate and reliable estimates even in an era of declining response rates. But this
same research also carries a warning that in some situations our estimates can be biased in important
ways by nonresponse.").
51. Am. Ass'n of Pub. Opinion Research, D.C. Chapter, Report on Workshop on Nonresponse Bias
in Household Surveys (Mar. 30, 2007), at 8.
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higher or lower response rates overall (suggesting that response rate did not affect
non-response bias).52
IV. FINDINGS53
The 3,087 returned surveys produced a large quantity of useful response data
for analysis. We have confidence in our findings due to the following factors:
* We designed and administered the survey with a low error struc-
ture;54
* A representative cross-section of target categories of arbitration par-
ticipants responded to the survey;
55
* Survey participants reflect a representative distribution of geograph-
ic regions; 56 and
* Survey participants reflect a representative cross-section of arbitra-
tion participants based on the amount of the claim, the amount of
damages awarded (if any), and the manner in which the case was
resolved.57
We describe in this section the responses to each of the thirty-eight questions
and their subparts.
A. Survey Participant Type
The first five questions and their subparts focused on categorizing the survey
participants and quantifying the level of survey participants' involvement in secur-
ities arbitrations over the past five years. Question 1 asked survey participants to
identify the nature of their involvement "in a dispute between a customer and a
securities brokerage firm and/or its registered representative(s) ('associated per-
son(s)') that was filed for arbitration before NASD or the NYSE." The survey
participants identified themselves as follows:
52. Id. At the workshop, Groves remarked: "I must admit for me this was a shocker the first time I
saw it. This sort of rocks your belief system if you've been training students for the last 30 years that
high response rates are really a good thing because it protects you from nonresponse bias." Id.
53. When we report a percentage of survey participants, this figure reflects the percentage of "valid"
survey participants, or the percentage of those survey participants who answered that question.
54. See supra, Part TI (C).
55. See infra, Fig. IA.
56. See infra, Fig. 9.
57. See infra, Figs. 10-12.
No. 2]
13
Gross and Black: Gross: When Perception Changes Reality
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2008
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Figure ]A
Nature of Number of survey Percentage of survey
involvement participants who participants who





Associated persons 460 15.3
Lawyer/other party 926 30.8
representative
Not involved in any such 6358 2.1
dispute
Thus, the largest number of survey participants were customers (1,359, or
45.1% of those who identified their role), followed by lawyers/other party repre-
sentatives (926, or 30.8%).
This analysis of the distribution of type of survey participant led us to consid-
er weighting the responses based on this distribution as compared to the distribu-
tion of type of contact in the mailing database. To ensure that a category of sur-
vey participants does not have the opportunity to have its opinion counted dispro-
portionally, accepted practice for survey researchers is to apply post-stratified
population weights to survey answers so as to adjust the impact of a participant
category on the overall answer for each question. However, researchers apply
these weights only if they have accurate classifications of both the contacts in the
mailing database and survey participants.59
Thus, we attempted to compare the classification distributions of survey Var-
ticipants to the classification distributions of contacts in the mailing database:
Figure lB
Category of contact Percentage of Percentage of survey
contacts in database participants
Customers 33% 45%
Lawyers/representatives 37% 31%
Associated persons 23% 15%
Corporate representatives 5% 7%
(of member firms)
58. These 63 survey participants who answered that they were not involved in a customer arbitration
in the past five years were excluded from the remaining survey questions. Thus, totals of valid survey
participants for other categories could be no more than 3,024 individuals (3,087 minus 63).
59. See, e.g., Weighting for Unequal Pi, 8 OFFICIAL STATISTICS 183 (1992).
60. FINRA, the entity that maintained the mailing database, categorized the contacts database.
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We concluded that we do not have sufficient confidence in the accuracy of
these classification percentages to justify weighting. We do not have confidence
because:
* FINRA has provided us with classifications for 97.5% of the con-
tacts in the database; 756 records, or 2.5% of the 29,850 total con-
tacts, could not be classified according to the categories we used.
Thus, we cannot classify 2.5% of the contacts.
0 We examined the detail of 1,570 NYSE records (99.6% of which
were lawyers) and 9,445 NASD records (100% of which were law-
yers) in the contacts database. Of those combined records, at least
1,500 are duplicates. Thus, lawyers as a classification are over-
represented in the contacts database percentage by at least 5%.
Moreover, in SRI's experience, participants do not fill out more
than one survey.
* 77 survey participants, representing 2.5% of the 3,024 valid survey
participants, did not answer question one, but did answer other sur-
vey questions. Thus, we cannot classify 2.5% of the survey partici-
pants.
61
Question 2 asked parties to a dispute whether they were represented by a law-
yer in that dispute. 81.7% (1,650) of those who identified themselves as a party to
an arbitration proceeding and who chose to answer the question reported that they
were represented by a lawyer. Of the remaining parties who chose to answer:
* 0.3% (6) were represented by a lawyer through a law school clinic;
* 1.7% (35) were represented by a non-lawyer; and
* 16.2% (328) represented themselves, either because:
o they did not want to be represented [5.4%],
o they could not afford a lawyer [8.6%], or
o they could not find a lawyer [2.2%].
61. Despite our lack of confidence in the weighting percentages to be applied, we tested the weights
by assuming the percentages as provided were accurate. We applied those weights to six questions (19,
34, 38a, 38b, 38c, and 38d). With respect to the overall data, the weighted results showed only a mar-
ginal difference in the responses [slightly more positive perceptions], and no trends or observations
would be changed. With respect to the analysis of customer vs. everyone else data, the customer num-
bers are unchanged; the "everyone else" numbers are changed less than one-half percent in every case
except one. In sum, even if we were to apply the most extreme weights we could envision applying,
there would be no substantial change in the overall results.
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Question 562 asked all parties, as well as lawyers/representatives involved in
more than one dispute, to provide the number of disputes in which they have been
involved in the past five years. A majority, 58.8% (1,510), of these survey partic-
ipants (2,570) have been involved in only one dispute. Three-quarters (75%) of
the survey participants who were involved in only one dispute who also answered
question one identified themselves as customers (1,115 out of 1,495). The break-
downs are as follows:
Figure 5
Number of disputes Number of survey Percentage of survey
involved in - past five participants who participants who




More than 10 546 21.2
Do not know 3 0.1
B. Pre-dispute Arbitration Clause (PDAA)
Questions 6 through 11 asked all survey participants a series of questions
about their most recent dispute. Question 6 focused on the PDAA. Of the 2,841
responses, 79.3% of survey participants (2,252) answered question 6(a) by indi-
cating that the customer agreement in the most recent dispute contained a PDAA.
Two hundred eight (7.3%) survey participants answered that the customer agree-
ment did not contain a PDAA, suggesting that PDAAs in brokerage firm agree-
ments are prevalent, but not universal. 13.4% (381) of survey participants did not
know or could not recall whether the customer agreement contained such a clause.
Question 6(b) focused on the participants' awareness of the PDAA before the
dispute arose. Of the 2,187 responses, 78.9% of survey participants (1,726) were
aware that the customer agreement contained a PDAA; 16% (351) were not
aware; 5% (110) did not know. When broken down by type of survey participant,
the percentages shift in a statistically significant manner. Thus, 63.29% of survey
participants who answered this question and identified themselves as customers
(692 responses) were aware that the customer agreement contained a PDAA be-
fore the dispute arose; 36.71% of customers were not aware.
63
Question 7 asked the survey participants to provide the primary reason the
dispute was filed in an arbitration forum. As shown below, of the 2,70n -es-
ponses, the largest number of survey participants answered that the dispute was
62. We do not include the responses to questions 3 and 4 because they asked only lawyers or party
representatives about the nature of their representation in the past five years.
63. To ensure enough observations for a response choice in order to run a valid chi-square test, for
this analysis and all subsequent statistical analyses, we did not include the "do not know" response as a
category if the response rate for that choice was less than 5% or less than 150 responses. Thus, because
fewer than 5% of customers answered "do not know" to question 6(b), we eliminated that response
from the "customer only" analysis.
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filed in an arbitration forum because it was required. 64 The final column reports
the distribution of answers just for those survey participants who identified them-
selves in response to question one as customers (1,197 responses). This distribu-
tion is different in a statistically significant manner from the distribution for all
survey participants.
Figure 7
Primary reason Number of Percentage of Percentage of
for filing the survey survey customer survey
dispute in participants who participants who participants who
arbitration selected this answered this answered this
response question question
Believed 1,169 41.9 41.6
arbitration was
required
Did not initiate the 709 25.4 3.84
claim
A lawyer 362 13.0 27.23
recommended it








Do not know/do 110 3.9 N/A
not recall
Believed 75 2.7 3.59
arbitration would
be more fair than
court
Preferred 32 1.1 2.01
arbitration for
other reasons





64. When recalculated to exclude those survey participants who indicated that they did not initiate
the claim, those who filed in an arbitration forum because it was required totals 56.2%.
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C. Concerns About Arbitration Before Filing
Question 8 asked about parties' concerns before the dispute was filed in arbi-
tration. We asked about their pre-filing concerns because we believe it is useful to
compare the parties' concerns before filing with the perception of the process after
the case closed. Survey participants indicated as follows:
65
Figure 8
Concerns Number of Percentage of Percentage who
before survey survey answered this
arbitration filed participants participants who question who
who selected this answered this self-identified as




I was concerned 1,178 40.1 39.1
that it would not
be a fair process
I had no 965 36.1 28
concerns









I was concerned 508 16.8 17.5
that it would be
expensive
I was concerned 423 12.3 16.6
that it would be a
slow process
I had other 410 17.0 9.8
concerns
I don't recall if 1 170 3.2 8.7
had any
concerns
65. The question instructed survey participants to select all that applied.
66. The difference between the answers for all survey participants and customers only was not
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D. Geographic Distribution
Question 9 asked survey participants to write the state in which the hearing
was scheduled to take place in their most recent dispute. If the dispute was a
Simplified Arbitration, the survey directed participants to write "paper case."
We then coded the 2,523 responses by region, according to FINRA Dispute Reso-
lution's four region-Northeast, Southeast, Midwest and West. The responses
demonstrate that the survey participants represent a fairly even cross-section of
the four regions in the country:
68
Figure 9
Region Number of survey Percentage of survey
participants whose participants who answered this
hearing was scheduled to question





Paper case 208 8.24
E. Nature of Most Recent Arbitration Dispute
Questions 10-12 asked survey participants to identify certain parameters
about the dispute. Question 10 (2,947 responses) asked about the amount of dam-
ages claimed (excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, interest and costs) in
the most recent dispute:
67. Simplified Arbitration is required for claims of $25,000 or less. A single public arbitrator de-
cides the dispute, there is limited discovery, and a hearing is not conducted unless the customer re-
quests it. CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 15, at 12800.
68. In 2006, NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc., closed its Mid-Atlantic region and realigned the re-
gional office assignments for several of its 68 heating locations. NASD, Notice to Members: NASD to
Close Mid-Atlantic Dispute Resolution Office October 6, 2006, at 1 (Sept. 2006),
http://www.complinet.com/file-store/pdf/rulebooks/nasd 06 -049.pdf. Since not all hearing locations
were reassigned to the same region, it is not possible to compare the regional distributions of survey
participants' hearing location with the regional distribution of the NASD and NYSE dockets during the
same time period. See id.
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Figure 10
Amount of damages Number of survey Percentage of survey
claimed in most participants who participants who
recent dispute selected this response answered this question





More than $1,000,000 425 14.4
Don't know 100 3.4
Question 11 (2,885 responses) asked how the dispute was resolved:
Figure 11
How the most Number Percentage of those Percentage of
recent dispute was who answered this customers who
resolved question answered this
question (N=1,237)
Award to customer 676 23.4 24.41
after hearing
Award to customer 129 4.5 8.25
based on papers
Claimant withdrew 63 2.2 1.86
the claim
Parties settled on 682 23.6 22.47
their own
Parties settled with 456 15.8 16.41
aid of mediator
No award to 95 3.3 6.22
customer based on
papers
Dismissed before 62 2.1 1.94
hearing
No award to 630 21.8 18.43
customer after
hearing
Do not know 92 3.2 N/A
Only survey participants involved in a dispute that resulted in an award for
the customer answered question 12. Question 12a (789 responses) asked the
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Figure 12A
Amount of damages Number of survey Percentage of survey
awarded in most participants who participants who





More than $1,000,000 38 4.8
Don't know 12 1.5
Question 12b (786 responses) asked what percentage of damages originally
claimed (excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, interest and costs) the
award represents:
Figure 12B
For awards, Number of survey Percentage of survey
percentage of participants who participants who
damages originally selected this response answered this question
claimed







Don't know 82 10.4
These responses demonstrate that the survey participants represent a cross-
section of arbitration participants based on the amount of the claim, the amount of
damages awarded (if any), and the manner in which the case was resolved.69 No
one type of arbitration participant dominated the survey participants.
F. Composition of Arbitration Panel
Questions 13-15 focused on the composition of the arbitration panel and any
perceived differences between public and industry arbitrators.7 ° Question 13
69. Although it would be instructive to compare the distribution of survey participants by how the
dispute was resolved to FINRA's statistics on how its cases closed, comparisons are not possible
because the categories FINRA tracks are different from those tracked in this survey.
70. If the claim is more than $50,000, the arbitration panel generally consists of three arbitrators, one
non-public arbitrator, customarily referred to as an industry arbitrator, and two public arbitrators, or
arbitrators who are not associated with the securities or commodities industry. See CuSTOMER CODE,
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(2,898 responses) asked all survey participants how many arbitrators were ap-
pointed to decide the dispute. 66.2% of survey participants (1,919) reported that
three arbitrators were appointed to decide the dispute; 16.1% (466) reported that
one arbitrator was appointed. In addition, 6.8% (197) answered that no arbitrators
were appointed (presumably because the case did not proceed that far in the
process); another 10.9% (316) did not know.
The survey directed those who responded that three arbitrators were ap-
pointed to answer questions 14a-14e.
* Q14a (1,817 responses): 47% (250) of customer-survey participants
(531) knew, prior to the filing of the arbitration, that one arbitrator
would be an "industry arbitrator." In contrast, 94% (1,211) of all
other types of survey participants (1,286) reported that they knew
this fact.
* Q14b (1,757 responses): 48% (244) of customer-survey participants
(508) knew, at some time during the dispute, which arbitrators were
"public" and which arbitrator was "industry," compared to 88%
(1,099) of all other types of survey participants (1,249) who knew
this information.
* Q14c (1,878 responses): 24% (138) of customers (576) perceived a
difference in performance between the industry and public arbitra-
tor, while 21.5% (124) of customers did not perceive a difference.
42.8% (247) of customers reported that they had no opportunity to
assess the arbitrators' performance; and 12% (67) of customers did
not know whether there was a difference. In contrast, for all other
types of survey participants (1302), 42% (543) did not perceive a
difference; 28% (368) had no opportunity to assess; 25% (325) per-
ceived a difference; and 5% (67) did not know.
* Q14d (1,748 responses): 36.5% (186) of customers (510) perceived
that the industry arbitrator favored at least one securities party at
some time during the dispute; 22% (122) of customers disagreed
that the industry arbitrator favored one side over the other at any
time during the dispute; 1.8% (9) perceived that the industry arbitra-
tor favored the customer; and 39.8% (203) of customers had no op-
portunity to assess the performance of the industry arbitrator. In
contrast, for all other types of survey participants (1,238): 50%
(618) disagreed that the industry arbitrator favored one side over the
other at any time during the dispute; 15.3% (189) perceived that the
industry arbitrator favored at least one securities party; 7.7% (95)
perceived that the industry arbitrator favored the customer; and
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27.1% (336) had no opportunity to assess the performance of the
industry arbitrator.71
Question 15 (2,250 responses) asked whether any public arbitrator favored
one side over the other at any time during the dispute. 24.2% (213) of customers
(881) responded that the public arbitrator did not favor one side over the other at
any time during the dispute; 28.7% (253) said the public arbitrator favored at least
one securities party; 2.2% (19) of customers said that the public arbitrator favored
the customer; 33.37% (294) said there was no opportunity to assess; and 11.58%
(102) did not know or recall. In contrast, for all other types of survey participants
(1,369), 49% (671) responded that the public arbitrator did not favor one side over
the other at any time during the dispute: 7.7% (105) said the public arbitrator fa-
vored at least one securities party; 13.2% (181) said that the public arbitrator fa-
vored the customer; 24.3% (332) said there was no opportunity to assess; and
5.8% (80) said that they did not know or recall.
Notably, for responses to questions 14a-15, the differences in customer-only
vs. all survey participant types were statistically significant.
G. Statements Seeking Range of Responses (Likert Scale Questions)
Questions 16-34 are "Likert scale" questions that directed survey participants
to read a statement and then indicate their response to that question as "strongly
agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree." Each
statement also supplied a "not applicable" as well as a "don't know" option. For
these questions, survey participants were reminded to base their responses on the
most recent dispute in which they were involved.
The following charts provide the statement and the range of responses distri-
buted by percentage with respect to two categories of survey participants: those
who identified themselves as customers and those who identified themselves as
non-customers. In general, customers had more negative perceptions, based on
their most recent experience, of the arbitration process. In addition, in some ques-
tions, the customers expressed a greater lack of knowledge about the process than
other survey participants. For all questions, the differences were statistically
significant.
71. Question 14e asked participants whether the award in their most recent three-arbitrator dispute
was unanimous or not. Because the number of survey participants who answered this sub-question was
so low, perhaps because of the sub-question's assumption that there was an award, we do not include
data for this sub-question.
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Figure 16
The arbitration panel appeared competent to resolve the dispute
(N = 2,115)
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Figure 17
The arbitration panel did not understand the issues involved In the case
(N = 2,263)
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Figure19
The arbitration panel was impartial
(N=2,275)
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Figure 21
The discovery process enabled me to obtain the information
needed for a hearing
(N = 2,392)
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Figure 22
The arbitration hearings took too long
(N = 1,908)
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Figure 23
At the hearing, the arbitration panel listened to the parties,
their representatives, and their witnesses
(N = 1,737)
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Figure 24
At the hearing, the arbitration panel understood the legal
arauments in the case
(N = 1,934)
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Figure 25
At the hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient
amount of time for the parties to present their evidence
(N = 1,893)
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Figure 26
At the hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient
amount of time for the parties to argue the merits of their case
(N = 1,712)
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Figure 29
The outcome was not very different from my initial expectations
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Figure 31
The arbitration panel did not apply the law to decide the dispute
(N = 2,068)
Figure 32
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Figure 34
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H. Arbitration vs. Litigation
Question 35 asked survey participants if, in the last five years, they had been
a party or represented a party in at least one civil court case (not involving a crim-
inal, matrimonial or custodial matter and excluding class action lawsuits). Of the
total responses (3,024), 59.6% (1,802 responses) said no. The others (1,222 res-
ponses) stated their involvement as follows: 72
Figure 35
Nature of Number of survey Percentage of survey
involvement participants participants who answered this
in a civil case question
None 1,802 59.6
Plaintiff in civil case 195 6.4
Represented plaintiff in 563 18.6
civil case
Defendant in civil case 140 4.6
Represented defendant 585 19.3
in civil case
Do not know/do not 42 1.4
recall
The survey directed those survey participants who indicated they were in-
volved in a civil case in the last five years to answer questions 35a and 35b, which
asked them to compare their experiences in court and arbitration.73 Question 35a
(1,084 responses) instructed survey participants to focus on their most recent ex-
72. The totals add up to more than 1,222 because this question directed survey participants to select
all that applied.
73. For both questions 35a and 35b, the number of customer survey participants who answered the
question is far lower than the total number of survey participants who answered this question, thus
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perience in a civil court case and asked how different they thought the result from
the arbitration would have been had it proceeded in court.
Figure 35A
How different Number of Percentage of those Percentage of
in court survey who answered this customers who
participants question answered this
who selected (N=1,084) question
this response (N=168)
Very different 539 49.7 51.8
A little 236 21.8 14.29
different
Exactly the 131 12.1 4.17
same
Do not know 178 16.4 29.8
Question 35b (1,088 responses) asked those same survey participants about
the fairness of securities arbitration as compared to their most recent experience in
a civil court case. While 30.9% of all responses found arbitration "very fair" or
"somewhat fair," another 48.9% found arbitration "very unfair" or "somewhat
unfair." In contrast, if we look only at customer-survey participants, a mere 17%
found arbitration "very fair" or "somewhat fair," and a
arbitration "very unfair" or "somewhat unfair."
striking 75.55% found
Figure 35B
How fair is Number of Percentage of Percentage of
securities survey those who customers who
arbitration as participants answered this answered this
compared to court? who selected question question
this response (N=1,088) (N=135)
Very fair 196 18.0 9.63
Somewhat fair 140 12.9 7.41
Equally fair 149 13.7 7.41
Somewhat unfair 197 18.1 12.59
Very unfair 335 30.8 62.96
Do not know 71 6.5 N/A
Question 36 (2,947 responses) asked all survey participants if, based on their
experiences in one or more customer arbitrations, given the choice, they would
choose arbitration to resolve a customer dispute in the future. 24.65% (335) of
customers (1,359) said they would, in comparison with 46% (730) of all other
participants (1,588). In contrast, 35% (473) of customers said they would not
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choose arbitration because it is unfair, in comparison with 25% (395) of all other
participants. The breakdown of all responses, as well as by customer-survey par-
ticipants, is as follows:
74
Figure 36
Would you choose Number of survey Percentage of Percentage of
arbitration in the participants who non-customers customers
future? selected this who answered who
response this question answered this
question
I would choose 1,065 46 24.7
arbitration over court
I would not choose 868 24.9 34.8
arbitration because it is
not fair
Not sure 602 15.9 25.8






I would not choose 218 8.4 6.18
arbitration because it is
more expensive
I would not choose 133 4.5 4.5
arbitration because it
takes more time
We then asked, in question 37 (2,857 responses), all survey participants
whether they were familiar with procedural rule changes made by the forums in
the past five years and, if so, their opinion of the changes. 93% (1,213) of cus-
tomers (1,306) said they were not familiar with the changes, in comparison with
40% (623) of all other participants (1,551). 75
I. Overall Perceptions of Arbitration
Finally, question 38 asked all survey participants the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with four statements regarding the securities arbitration
process. For these questions, the survey participants were asked their "opinion"
and were not instructed to focus on their experience in their most recent dispute.
74. The question directed survey participants to select all that applied.
75. We do not provide the opinions of customers who said they were familiar with the changes
because there were so few of them.
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Figure 38a (N=2,617)
Arbitration was Simple for All Parties
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Figure 38b (N=2,613)
Arbitration was Fair for All Parties
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Figure 38c (N=2,824)
Arbitration was Economical for All Parties
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS
This survey gathered a wealth of useful data that adds to the current under-
standing of participants' perceptions of the fairness of securities arbitration. Our
analysis of the data indicates that, overall, survey participants' perceptions of
securities arbitration are nuanced, complex and resist summary categorization.
Individual investors (customers), however, spoke with a clearer voice. As dis-
cussed below, customers have more negative views about their most recent securi-
ties arbitration experience than all other participants (as a group) in the process.
A. Customers Have a Favorable View of Arbitrators' Attentiveness and
Competence
A majority of customers gave positive assessments, based on their experience
at their most recent dispute, of the arbitrators' attentiveness at the hearing and
their competence, as well as the sufficiency of time at the hearing to argue the
merits of the case (although, for each question, customers' responses were less
favorable than those of all other participants as a group). Thus:
* 74% of customers agreed with the positive statement that "at the
hearing, the arbitration panel listened to the parties, their representa-
tives and their witnesses," while 20% of customers disagreed with
the statement. In comparison, 84% of all other participants agreed
with the statement, and 10% of all other participants disagreed with
it.
76
* 54.5% of customers agreed with the positive statement that "the ar-
bitration panel appeared competent to resolve the dispute," while
27% of customers disagreed with the statement. In comparison,
70% of all other participants agreed with the agreement, and 20% of
all other participants disagreed with it.
77
* 54% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that "at the
hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient amount of
time for the parties to argue the merits of their case," while 28% of
customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 79% of all
other participants disagreed with the statement, and 9% of all other
participants agreed with it.
78
A high percentage of customers also expressed general satisfaction about oth-
er aspects of the performance of the arbitrators, based on their most recent expe-
rience (although, again, they did not give them as high marks as did all other par-
ticipants). Thus,
76. See supra, Fig. 23.
77. See supra, Fig. 16.
78. See supra, Fig. 26.
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* 47% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that "at the
hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient amount of
time for the parties to present their evidence," while 19% of cus-
tomers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 77% of all other
participants disagreed with the statement, and 8% of all other partic-
ipants agreed with it.
79
* 40% of customers agreed with the positive statement that "the arbi-
tration panel appeared competent to resolve pre-hearing issues,"
while 22% of customers disagreed with the statement. In compari-
son, 61% of all other participants agreed with the statement, and
23% of all other participants disagreed with it.
80
* 40% of customers agreed with the positive statement that "the dis-
covery process enabled me to obtain the information necessary for a
hearing," while 29% of customers disagreed with the statement. In
comparison, 56% of all other participants agreed with the statement,
and 29% of all other participants disagreed with it.8
* 38% of customers disagreed with the negative statement that "the
arbitration panel did not understand the issues involved in the case,"
while 31 % of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison,
56% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 27%
of all other participants agreed with it.
82
* 38% of customers agreed with the positive statement that "at the
hearing, the arbitration panel understood the legal arguments in the
case," while 24% of customers disagreed with the statement. In
comparison, 53% of all other participants agreed with the statement,
and 28% of all other participants disagreed with it.
83
Customers were about equally divided on whether "the arbitration hearings
took too long," with 36% of customers disagreeing with the negative statement
and 35% of customers agreeing with it. In comparison, 44% of all other partici-
pants disagreed with the negative statement, and 33% of all other participants
agreed with it. 84 Finally, 35% of customers believed that the arbitrators "did not
apply the law to decide the dispute," while 17% of customers disagreed with that
statement. If customers believe that arbitrators should apply the law, then that is a
negative assessment of their performance. In comparison, 39% of all other partic-
79. See supra, Fig. 25.
80. See supra, Fig. 20.
81. See supra, Fig. 21.
82. See supra, Fig. 17.
83. See supra, Fig. 24. This rare instance where all other participants have a greater negative re-
sponse to a positive statement than the customers may reflect the likelihood that all other participants
have a better understanding of the legal principles, because 23% of customers said, "I do not know,"
compared with 6% of all other participants.
84. See supra, Fig. 22.
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ipants believed that the arbitrators did not apply the law, and 35% of all other
participants disagreed with the statement.
85
B. A Significant Percentage of Customers Believe
the Arbitration Panel is Biased
The questions that generated the most negative customer reactions asked
about perceptions of arbitrator impartiality, based on their most recent experience
in arbitration. Thus:
* 41% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that "the
arbitration panel was impartial," while 25% of customers agreed
with it. In comparison, 31% of all other participants disagreed with
the statement, and 48% of all other participants agreed with it.86
a 40% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that "the
arbitration panel was open-minded," while 28% of customers
agreed with it. In comparison, 29% of all other participants disa-
greed with the statement, and 49% of all other participants agreed
with it.
87
Customers were more equivocal, however, when asked directly to compare
the performance of the public and the industry arbitrator, perhaps because many of
them had no opportunity to assess the arbitrators' performance. Thus,
* 24% of customers perceived a difference between the performance
of the public arbitrators and the industry arbitrator, while 21.5% of
customers said there was no difference. In comparison, 25% of all
other participants perceived a difference, and 42% did not.89
* 36.5% of customers perceived that the industry arbitrator favored at
least one securities party, while 22% of customers disagreed with
the statement that the industry arbitrator favored one side over the
other. In comparison, 15% of all other participants perceived that
the industry arbitrator favored at least one securities party, and
85. See supra, Fig. 31.
86. See supra, Fig. 19. A small number of survey participants answered this question while indicat-
ing in response to question 11 that their most recent dispute did not progress to a hearing. Thus, a small
number of responses to this question appear to be based on perceptions derived from something other
than those participants' experiences at a hearing in their most recent dispute that was filed for arbitra-
tion. This observation also applies to the data for questions 22 through 26.
87. See supra, Fig. 18.
88. See supra, Figs. 14 and 15. Forty-three percent of customers said that they had no opportunity to
assess the performance of the public vs. the industry arbitrator, compared with 28% of all other partici-
pants (Question 14c), 40% of customers said they had no opportunity to assess the performance of the
industry arbitrator, compared with 27% of all other participants (Question 14d), and 33% of customers
said there was no opportunity to assess the performance of the public arbitrator, compared with 24%
of all other participants (Question 15).
89. See supra, Fig. 14c.
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50% of all other participants disagreed with the statement that the
industry arbitrator favored one side over the other. 2% of custom-
ers answered that the industry arbitrator favored the customer, com-
pared with 8% of all other participants.9"
29% of customers said the public arbitrator favored at least one se-
curities party, while 24% of customers responded that the public ar-
bitrator did not favor one side over the other at any time during the
dispute, and 2% of customers said that the public arbitrator favored
the customer. In comparison, 8% of all other participants said the
public arbitrator favored at least one securities party, 49% of all
other participants said that the public arbitrator did not favor one
side over the other at any time during the dispute, and 13% of all
other participants said that the public arbitrator favored the custom-
er.
91
C. Customers are Dissatisfied with the Outcome
Customers expressed strong dissatisfaction with the outcome of their most re-
cent securities arbitration case. An overwhelming 71% of customers disagreed
with the positive statement that "I am satisfied with the outcome," and only 22%
of customers agreed with that statement.92 In comparison, the responses of all
other participants were about equally divided, with 45% disagreeing with the
statement and 46% of all other participants agreeing with it.93 Furthermore, a
majority of customers (56%) disagreed with the positive statement that "the out-
come was not very different from my initial expectation," while 30% of customers
agreed with the statement. 94 In comparison, 36% of all other participants disa-
greed with the statement, and 47% of all other participants agreed with it.
95
We cannot, of course, assess the basis for participants' initial expectations or
their reasonableness. As expected, upon closer examination, a party's satisfaction
rates tended to decrease in direct correlation to that party's degree of success in
his/her most recent dispute as measured by his/her response to questions 11 (man-
ner of resolution) and 12b (percentage of damages originally claimed that were
actually awarded). Accordingly, it is clear that customers with less successful
outcomes were more disappointed with the results.
Moreover, 55% of customers agreed with the negative statement that "I
would be more satisfied if I had an explanation of the award," and only 25% of
customers disagreed with that statement. 96 In comparison, 44% of all other partic-
ipants said they would be more satisfied if they had an explanation, and 36% of all
other participants disagreed with the statement.97 We cannot assess whether this
90. See supra, Fig. 14d.
91. See supra, Fig. 15.
92. See supra, Fig. 27.
93. Id.
94. See supra, Fig. 29
95. Id.
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response is more a reflection of their dissatisfaction with the outcome than an
actual desire for an explanation. More than two years ago, NASD proposed
changing the arbitration rules to require arbitrators to issue an explained award if
the customer requests it.98 It remains to be seen whether these findings will pro-
vide momentum for FINRA's revival of the proposal. 99
D. Customers Do Not Believe Arbitration
Compares Favorably to Litigation
The survey asked participants to compare their experience in arbitration to a
comparable litigation experience. 100 Because of the small number of customers
who answered these questions, we believe the responses are of limited utility.
Moreover, because so few customer-broker disputes have proceeded through the
courts in the last twenty years, we doubt that many of those who responded to this
question could make a valid comparison. However, from the perspective of those
customers who responded, arbitration fared poorly by comparison. 0 1
All survey participants were asked if, based on their overall arbitration expe-
rience, given the choice, they would choose arbitration to resolve a customer dis-
pute in the future. 35% of customers responded that they would not choose arbi-
tration because it is unfair, 25% of customers said they would choose arbitration,
and another 26% of customers were not sure.10 2 In comparison, 25% of all other
participants said they would not choose arbitration because it is unfair, 46% of all
other participants said they would choose arbitration, and 16% said they were not
sure.
Particularly with respect to customers, who are unlikely to have had any
comparable litigation experience, 1°4 these responses may be best explained as a
reflection of their dissatisfaction with their arbitration experience - "anything else
must be better than this."
E. Customers Lack Knowledge of the Securities Arbitration Process
Perhaps our most consistent-though not surprising-finding was the cus-
tomers' lack of knowledge about securities arbitration. Individual investors stated
that they have less knowledge about the arbitration process more frequently than
other participants in the process. Some of this lack of knowledge relates to the
composition of the arbitration panel. Thus,
98. See supra, note 16.
99. As discussed below, we believe these findings compel a fresh look at the explained awards
proposal. See infra, notes 153-59 and accompanying text.
100. See supra, Figs. 35a and b.
101. See supra, Fig. 35b.
102. See supra, Fig. 36.
103. Id.
104. Since the Supreme Court declared PDAAs enforceable in all customer disputes, supra, note 3,
few customers have been able to litigate their claims, as reflected in the small number of customers
who responded to questions 35a and b, supra, note 73.
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* 47% of customers knew, prior to the filing of the arbitration, that
one arbitrator would be an "industry arbitrator," compared with
94% of all other participants. 
05
* 48% of customers knew, at some time during the dispute, which ar-
bitrators were "public" and which arbitrator was "industry," com-
pared with 88% of all other types of survey participants. 1
06
Customers also stated they "did not know" in response to questions assessing
the arbitrators' performance more frequently than all other participants as a group.
Customers may answer "do not know" because they believe they do not have
sufficient knowledge of the substantive and procedural law governing arbitration
to answer these questions. Thus,
* 33% of customers said they did not know whether "the arbitration panel
did not apply the law to decide the dispute," compared to 11% of all oth-
er participants.' 07
* 24% of customers said they did not know whether "the arbitration panel
appeared competent to resolve pre-hearing issues," compared with 6% of
all other participants.' 
08
* 23% of customers said they did not know whether "at the hearing, the
arbitration panel understood the legal arguments in the case," compared
with 6% of all other participants."
0 21% of customers said they did not know whether "the arbitration panel
was impartial," compared with 6% of all other participants. 1
0
0 20% of customers said they did not know whether "the arbitration panel
was open-minded," compared with 7% of all other participants."'
* 18% of customers said they did not know whether "at the hearing, the
arbitration panel did not provide a sufficient amount of time for the par-
ties to p~resent their evidence," compared with 4% of all other partici-
pants. 11
105. See supra, Fig. 14a.
106. See supra, Fig. 14b.
107. See supra, Fig. 31.
108. See supra, Fig. 20.
109. See supra, Fig. 24.
110. See supra, Fig. 19.
111. See supra, Fig. 18.
112. See supra, Fig. 25.
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* 17% of customers said they did not know whether "the arbitration panel
did not understand the issues involved in the case," compared with 5% of
all other participants.'
13
* 12% of customers said they did not know or did not recall whether the
public arbitrator favored one side over the other at any time during the
dispute, compared with 6% of all other participants."1
4
Moreover, in their responses to other questions relating to aspects of arbitra-
tion other than arbitrators' performance, customers said they "did not know" more
frequently than all other participants. This expression of lack of knowledge,
again, may reflect less familiarity with the substantive law and arbitration proce-
dure than what all other participants are likely to have. For example, 18% of cus-
tomers said that they did not know whether "the discovery process enabled me to
obtain the information necessary for a hearing," compared with 4% of all other
participants. 115 So few customers indicated familiarity with recent changes in
arbitration rules that we did not tabulate their responses to this question.' 1
6
It is certainly not surprising that many customers express less knowledge of
the process since, unlike the other participants, few of them are likely to be law-
yers with an expertise in this area or members of the securities industry. While
customers may believe (rightly or wrongly) that they have a good understanding
of at least some aspects of the judicial system - for example, criminal trials which
are frequently featured in popular media both in fictionalized and real-life ac-
counts - they are less likely to believe this about a specialized process whose pro-
ceedings do not make headlines, are kept confidential, and are not the subject of
television shows. While investors' lack of knowledge may color their views of
their most recent securities arbitration experience, we have no basis to assume it
results in a more negative assessment. It does indicate, however, that the forum
and customers' lawyers' 7 need to step up their efforts to educate investors about
brokerage firms' legal duties to their customers and, in particular, the securities
arbitration process.
F. Customers Have Unfavorable Perceptions Overall of the Fairness of
Securities Arbitration
Our study found that customers express a consistently negative impression of
the overall arbitration process, whether based on their most recent experience or
on their general impressions. Thus, 63% of customers did not believe that, over-
all, the process was fair, 18 60% of customers did not have a favorable view of
113. See supra, Fig. 17.
114. See supra, Fig. 15.
115. See supra, Fig. 21.
116. See supra, Fig. 37.
117. We have heard anecdotally about investors' complaints that their lawyers misled them about
their chances of success in arbitration and about the cost and/or length of the process.
118. Specifically, 63% of customers disagreed with the positive statement, "[A]s a whole, I feel the
arbitration process was fair," and 28% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison, 40% of
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arbitration,' l9 52% of customers would not recommend arbitration to others, 120
and 49% of customers said it was too expensive.' 2' Moreover, when directed to
respond based on their overall impressions of the fairness of the securities arbitra-
tion process, customers responded even more negatively than when directed to
focus on their most recent arbitration experience.122 Thus,
* 61% of customers disagreed with the statement that "arbitration was
fair for all parties," 25% of customers agreed with the statement,
and 14% of customers neither agreed nor disagreed with the state-
ment. In comparison, 44% of all other participants disagreed with
the statement, 45% of all other participants agreed with the state-
ment, and 11% of all other participants neither agreed nor disagreed
with the statement.' 
23
* 49% of customers disagreed with the statement that "arbitration was
without bias," 19% of customers agreed with the statement, 19% of
customers said they did not know, and 13% of customers neither
agreed nor disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 41% of all
other participants disagreed with the statement, 40% of all other
participants agreed with the statement, 5% of all other participants
said they did not know, and 14% of all other participants neither
agreed nor disagreed with the statement. 124
* 45.5% of customers disagreed with the statement that "arbitration
was simple for all parties," and 37% of customers agreed with the
statement. In comparison, 29% of all other participants disagreed
with the statement, and 54% of all other participants agreed with it.
An equal percentage (18%) of customers and all other participants
neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement.125
all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 51% of all other participants agreed with it. See
supra, Fig. 34.
119. 60% of customers disagreed with the positive statement, "I have a favorable view of securities
arbitration for customer disputes," and 28% of customers agreed with the statement. In comparison,
41% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 45% of all other participants agreed
with it. See supra, Fig. 33.
120. 52% of customers disagreed with the positive statement that "I would recommend to others that
they use arbitration to resolve their securities disputes," and 32% of customers agreed with the state-
ment. In comparison, 34% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, and 49% of all other
participants agreed with it. See supra, Fig. 32.
121. 49% of customers agreed with the negative statement that "the arbitration process was too ex-
pensive," and 25% of customers disagreed with the statement. In comparison, 44% of all other partici-
pants agreed with the statement, and 36% of all other participants disagreed with it. See supra, Fig. 30.
122. These findings must be reconciled with the reality that customers are likely to have had only one
experience with the process. Surveyors typically devalue answers to questions seeking impressions
because they are much more subject to recall bias. See supra, note 43 and accompanying text. The fact
that customers' impressions were more negative than for their most recent experience, even though
most of the population likely only had one experience, lends support to the hypothesis that recall bias
and other factors other than their actual experience contributed greatly to their negative perceptions.
123. See supra, Fig. 38b.
124. See supra, Fig. 38d.
125. See supra, Fig. 38a.
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37% of customers disagreed with the statement that "arbitration was
economical for all parties," 28% of customers agreed with the
statement, 20% of customers neither agreed nor disagreed with the
statement, and 15.5% of customers did not know. In comparison,
35% of all other participants disagreed with the statement, 42% of
all other participants agreed with the statement, 18% of all other
participants neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement, and
5% of all other participants did not know.'
26
In the next section, we explore some possible explanations for these consis-
tently negative impressions.
G. Explanations for Customers' Negative Perceptions
Because the survey (intentionally) did not ask open-ended questions, we can
offer only theories explaining customers' negative perceptions about the fairness
of securities arbitration.127 Our first three theories directly stem from the process
itself; our remaining theories stem from more remote factors.
1. Explanations Related to the Process
Securities Arbitration is Unfair. One explanation may be that securities arbi-
tration is unfair. Indeed, certain of our survey data buttresses this conclusion:
while 39% of customers had concerns about the fairness of the process before they
filed their dispute with the arbitration forum,128 a disturbing 63% of customers do
not agree that, after their most recent arbitration experience, the process was
fair. 129 We were particularly struck by the fact that customers' level of discontent
increased by more than 20 percentage points after going through a securities arbi-
tration proceeding.
Moreover, all recent studies of outcomes based on published awards show a
decline in investors' win rates in recent years, providing some support for this
theory.' 30 First, Empirical Evidence of Worsening Conditions for the Investor in
Securities Arbitration'31 concluded that conditions have worsened over time for
investors: their success rate has declined, brokers are more likely to prevail on
their counterclaims, and repeat players have a competitive advantage. Second, a
2007 study entitled Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes: A Statistical
126. See supra, Fig. 38c.
127. We had hoped to explore some of these theories in follow-up telephone interviews with survey
participants who expressed a willingness to speak about their experience, but SICA declined to allow
this.
128. See supra, Fig. 8.
129. See supra, Fig. 34.
130. Awards generally give insufficient information to make an assessment of the merits of the claim,
and more than 50% of filed claims are concluded by settlement that does not result in an award. See
Summary Arbitration Statistics September 2008 [hereinafter Summary Arbitration Statistics],
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/FNRADisputeResolution/Statistics/index.htm (scroll down
to "How Arbitration Cases Close").
131. Richard A. Voytas, Empirical Evidence of Worsening Conditions for Investor in Securities
Arbitration, 2002 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 7 (June 2002).
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Analysis of How Claimants Fare132 analyzed SRO awards from 1995-2004. Its
findings include: "[1] claimant win rates have declined since 1999, [2] claimant
win rates are lower against larger brokerage firms, [3] awards as a percent of
amount claimed have declined since 1998, and [4] the larger the case, the lower
the award as a percent of the amount claimed."' 33 Third, in 2007, the Securities
Arbitration Commentator ("SAC") completed a two-part survey of SRO awards,
in which it compared results in 2005 to 2000-04 results. 134 Its findings include:
(1) a decline in customer win rates from 53% in 2001 to 43% in 2005 and (2) a
decline in customer median recovery rates (median award/median compensation
claimed) from 47% in 2000 to 34% in 2005.35
These studies arguably provide some evidence of a decline in substantive jus-
tice for investors, although recent FINRA statistics show improved win rates for
customers in 2008.136 The inability to assess the merits of the claims 137 and the
absence of comparable statistics for settled cases makes this evidence of limited
value.' 38 However, we are aware of no study that has measured the substantive
fairness of securities arbitration, taking into account both the merits of the claims
and the outcomes of settled cases, nor do we think one could be readily accom-
plished without more transparent awards and a healthy volume of comparable
cases in court or an independent arbitration forum. 1
39
Appearance of Bias. A second process-related explanation is that the mere
appearance of bias from the presence of an industry arbitrator on a three-arbitrator
panel fuels customers' negative perceptions, outweighing other hallmarks of pro-
cedural fairness contained in FINRA arbitration rules, such as requirements of
notice, a right to be heard, fee waivers for demonstrated hardship, automatic dis-
covery and a convenient hearing location. t4° Our findings lend credence to this
theory: 33.6% of customers had concerns about arbitrator bias pre-filing, t41 41%
did not believe the arbitration panel was impartial in their most recent arbitra-
132. Edward S. O'Neal & Daniel R. Solin, Mandatory Arbitration of Securities Disputes - A Statis-
tical Analysis of How Claimants Fare, 1-17 (2007) [hereinafter O'Neal/Solin Study],
http://www.slcg.com/pdf/workingpapers/Mandatory%20Arbitration%2OStudy.pdf. This report is
discussed further infra, in notes 161-65 and accompanying text.
133. O'Neil & Solin, supra note 132, at 1-17.
134. See Years in Review, 2007 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (Feb. 2007), 2006 SEC. ARB.
COMMENTATOR 1 (Apr. 2006).
135. 2007 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 3 (Feb. 2007).
136. Through August 2008, customers were awarded damages in 42% of cases (130), compared with
37% (245) for all of 2007. See Summary Arbitration Statistics, supra note 130 (scroll down to "Results
of Customer Claimant Arbitration Award Cases").
137. The industry, for example, accounts for the drop in investors' win rates in recent years by assert-
ing that many of investors' claims arising out of the tech crash were without merit. See SIFMA White
Paper, supra note 7, at 38, 40-42.
138. Thus, while 37% of cases decided in 2007 awarded damages to customers, FINRA asserts that
nearly 80% of customer cases closed through settlement or award resulted in monetary or non-
monetary recovery for investors; see Summary Arbitration Statistics, supra note 130 (scroll down to
"Results of Customer Claimant Arbitration Award Cases").
139. See 2000 GAO Report, supra note 29.
140. See Gross, The Regulation of Fairness, supra note 18, at 101, 126.
141. See supra, Fig. 8.
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tion1 42 and 49% of customers disagreed with the statement that arbitration was
without bias for all parties.
43
SAC conducted the most thoughtful attempt to measure the presence or ab-
sence of the industry arbitrator's bias. 144 For 2003, it compared the win rates for
customers in Simplified Arbitrations, 145 where there is only one public arbitrator,
with win rates in disputes decided by three-person panels, where one member is
an industry arbitrator. SAC recognized that a significant limitation of its survey is
the different nature of the Simplified Arbitration experience, including smaller
amounts involved and the nature of the claim. 146 Most significantly, 73% of the
claims were decided on the papers and not by a hearing. All these factors make a
comparison between the two categories of dubious validity. It found, for small
claims, a 42% win rate on the papers, a 58% win rate after a hearing, and, for
three-person hearings, a 51% win rate. Recognizing that attempting to extrapolate
these findings into a conclusion about the presence of the industry arbitrator is "a
more difficult calculation,"'' 47 SAC stated that the 51% win rate of the three-
person panel and the 58% win rate for a one-person hearing prevented it from
concluding that the presence of the industry arbitrator "proves neutral to help-
ful.,
14 8
To be sure, the problem of biased arbitrators is not confined to the industry
arbitrator. Investors' advocates frequently complain that some public arbitrators
consistently favor brokerage firms, either by finding against the customer or
awarding low damages amounts, because they want brokerage firms to select them
for additional cases. One empirical study found that pro-industry arbitrators, as
determined based on published awards, are selected more often to panels than pro-
investor arbitrators, particularly where a large brokerage firm is a party, the re-
quested compensatory damages are large, and the customer alleges firm miscon-
duct.149 Moreover, selection on the basis of arbitrator bias increased after FINRA
changed to a system where parties, and not the forum, selected the arbitrators.'
50
Ironically, the SEC approved the adoption of the Neutral List Selection System
("NLSS") 15 ' because it believed "that allowing parties greater input into the selec-
142. See supra, Fig. 19.
143. See supra, Fig. 38d
144. Industry Arbitrator Award Study, Does the Securities Industry Arbitrator's Presence Create a
Discernible Shift in Award Outcomes?, 2005 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1 (May 2005) [hereinafter
SAC Industry Arbitrator Study].
145. See supra, note 67.
146. Thus, it decided not to focus on 2004, because it believed the results may be aberrational, in part,
because of the large number of unsuccessful claims and the presence of more pro se claimants resulting
from the "conflicted analysts" claims in the aftermath of the Analysts' Global Settlement. See SAC
Industry Arbitrator Study, supra note 144, at 4.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Jiro E. Kondo, Self-Regulation and Enforcement in Financial Markets: Evidence from Investor-
Broker Disputes at the NASD 2, 13 (Nov. 20, 2006) (academic working paper examining arbitration
awards from January 1991 to December 2004), available at
http://web.mit.edu/jekondo/www/jobmkt-paper.pdf .
150. Id. at 3, 22.
151. The Neutral List Selection System is a computer system that generates, on a random basis, lists
of possible arbitrators. For three-arbitrator panels, the parties receive three lists, chair, non-public
(industry), and public, and select their panel through a process of striking and ranking the arbitrators on
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tion of the arbitrators to hear their cases will help ensure a more fair and neutral
arbitration process."
152
Investor advocates also criticize the definition of public arbitrator as includ-
ing individuals who nonetheless have connections to the industry. A recent study
focused on the role of attorneys as arbitrators and found that panels where the
chair was an attorney who represented brokerage firms in other securities arbitra-
tions awarded customers significantly less in compensatory damages. 153 In con-
trast, the study did not find that attorneys who represented investors, or who
represented both investors and firms, in securities arbitrations were more generous
in awards. 154 The study also tested for the effect of the adoption of the NLSS and
found that greater party involvement in the selection process correlates with a
reduction in the size of awards. 55 It found no evidence that the 2004 rule changes
that expanded the definition of non-public arbitrator and tightened the definition
of public arbitrator156 had any effect.157 Both these studies suggest that brokerage
firms have more influence over the arbitration forum by reason of their "repeat
player" status than do customers' lawyers and that reform to place the arbitrator
selection process in the control of the parties has increased firms' dominance.
They also provide support for investor advocates' frequent assertion that the in-
dustry is successful in selecting public arbitrators who will side with the industry.
It remains to be seen whether the SEC's 2007 approval of the revised list selection
system, precluding, among other things, the industry arbitrator from serving as
the lists. For one-arbitrator panels, parties strike and rank names provided by FINRA on one list of
public arbitrators. See CUSTOMER CODE, supra note 15, at 12400.
152. See Order Granting Approval to Proposed Rule Changes Relating to the Selection of Arbitrators
in Arbitrations Involving Public Customers, 63 Fed. Reg. 56,670, 56,681 (Oct. 22, 1998).
153. Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & A.C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, at 4, 22-23 (N.Y.U. L.
& Econ. Research Paper No. 08-18, April 2008) [hereinafter Attorneys as Arbitrators], available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1086372.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 37. The study recognized the difficulty in establishing causality but concluded that "at the
very least the evidence is inconsistent with the view that this reform assisted investor claimants." Id.
156. Those rule changes, among other things: (1) expanded the definition of a "non-public arbitrator"
to include those who had been associated with a registered broker-dealer or commodities firm during
the previous five years (as opposed to three years); (2) clarified that a non-public arbitrator - which
already included those who had "retired" from the securities industry - also included those who spent a
substantial part of their careers in the securities industry; (3) excluded from the definition of "public
arbitrator" (a) anyone who has been associated with the industry for at least twenty years, no matter
how long ago that association had ended, and (b) attorneys, accountants and other professionals whose
firms have derived 10% or more of their annual revenue, in the previous two years, from securities or
commodities industry clients. The rule change also added to the definition of "immediate family mem-
ber" (whose association with the securities industry is imputed to the arbitrator) parents, children,
stepparents and any member of the arbitrator's household. See Order Granting Approval to a Proposed
Rule Change Relating to Arbitrator Classification and Disclosure in NASD Arbitrations, 69 Fed. Reg.
21,871 (Apr. 16, 2004). To further ensure the neutrality of arbitrators, in 2006 and 2008, the SEC
approved additional rule changes amending the definition of public arbitrators to exclude from the
public roster those with indirect ties to the securities industry. See Order Approving Proposed Rule
Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, 73 Fed. Reg. 15,025 (Mar. 20, 2008); Self-
Regulatory Organizations, Order Approving Proposed Rule Change Relating to the Classification of
Arbitrators, 71 Fed. Reg. 62,026 (Oct. 20, 2006).
157. See Attorneys as Arbitrators, supra note 153, at 135-37.
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chairperson, s58 as well as its 2008 approval of FINRA's tightened definition of a
public arbitrator 159 will redress these criticisms going forward.
Lack of Transparency. The absence of an explanation from most awards in
customer cases is a third process-related explanation for customers' negative per-
ceptions. While awards must be in writing and include certain identifying infor-
mation about the case, the Customer Code does not require arbitrators to include
reasons, authorities, or explanations in their awards (although they may choose to
include them).160 In 2005, FINRA proposed a rule change to require arbitrators to
write an explanation of the award, at the request of the customer.' 61 That proposal
was met with extensive criticism from most stakeholders in the process, 62 and has
since languished in the rule-making process. 163
Yet, 55% of customers who responded to our survey agreed that they would
be more satisfied with the outcome in their most recent arbitration if the award
included an explanation. 164 This desire for explained outcomes is consistent with
procedural justice theorists who value transparency in decision-making.165 De-
priving participants of this element of procedural justice may very well foster
negative views of the process as a whole. Although we have previously expressed
our ambivalence about FINRA's explained awards proposal, primarily due to the
risks that arbitrators will be more reluctant to infuse equity into their decision-
making and awards will be more vulnerable to vacatur motions, 166 we now believe
that the SEC and FINRA can no longer ignore the customers' strong desire for
explained awards. The Customer Code should be revised to enhance the transpa-
rency of arbitrator decision-making.
Outcome Trumps All. One final process-centered explanation as to why cus-
tomers believe securities arbitration is unfair despite many procedural protections
is that outcome trumps everything. A customer, however fairly treated by objec-
tive standards, will not, in the face of an outcome he perceives as unreasonable,
accept that he was treated fairly. Moreover, a customer is likely to view as unfa-
vorable an award of damages that is considerably less than the requested amount.
158. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Changes to Amend NASD Arbitration Rules of Customer
Disputes, 72 Fed. Reg. 4,574, 4,585 (Jan. 31, 2007).
159. See Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the Definition of Public Arbitrator, 73
Fed. Reg. 15,025, 15026-28 (Mar. 20, 2008).
160. See CUSTOMER CODE Rule 12904 (listing required elements of awards).
161. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change to Provide Written Explanations in Arbitration
Awards Upon the Request of Customers or Associated Persons in Industry Controversies, 70 Fed. Reg.
41,065 (proposed July 15, 2005).
162. Comments to the explained award rule filing are posted on the SEC's web-
site,http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/nasd/nasd2005032.shtml.
163. See FINRA, SR 2005-NASD-032, at
http://www.finra.orgflndustry/Regulation/RuleFilings/2005/PO13542 (containing additional filings
related to this proposed rule change, including two extensions of time FINRA filed with SEC to re-
spond to comments to the proposal).
164. See supra, Fig. 28.
165. See Richard C. Reuben, Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of Arbitration, 67
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 279, 289, 301 (2004) (identifying transparency as a value in democratic
processes and stating that "[tiransparency is generally not an animating value of arbitration" because
arbitrators are not required to include reasons in their awards).
166. See Black & Gross, Explained Award of Damocles, supra note 16, at 22-23.
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The previously mentioned recent empirical studies 67 provide some support
for this explanation. In particular, the O'Neal/Solin Study 168 provides an exten-
sive review of awards in NASD and NYSE customer arbitrations between January
1995 and December 2004.169 As with other studies, it reports on how often cus-
tomers win and their recovery as a percentage of the claimed compensatory dam-
ages and reaches conclusions consistent with other reports. Thus, it finds that,
while the overall win rate for the ten-year period was 51%, the win rates declined
from a high in 1999 of 59% to a low of 44% in 2004. It also finds that awards as a
percentage of claimed compensatory damages declined from a 1998 high of 68%
to a consistent 49-50% in 2002-2004.170 In addition, this study focuses on
amounts awarded in comparison with the size of the claim and the size of the se-
curities firm named as respondent. It finds that the greater the amount of claimed
damages, the lower the percentage of recovery; thus, the percentage of recovery
ranges from 37% in claims over $250,000 to 76% of claims of less than
$10,000. 7 1 It also finds that the win rate was 39% against the three largest bro-
kerage firms and 43% against the next seventeen largest firms, 17 2 in contrast to the
overall 51% win rate. As in other studies, the analysis necessarily cannot take into
account the merits of the customers' claims, the reasonableness of the amount
claimed as damages, or the outcomes of many settlements that do not result in an
award. Its findings, however, are at least consistent with the frequently-expressed
view that some arbitrators will rule in favor of large brokerage firms, particularly
in cases claiming a large amount in damages, because they seek the repeat busi-
ness. 17 3 It also confirms that, for whatever reason, investors have had more diffi-
culty prevailing in securities arbitration in recent years. Thus, a focus solely on
outcomes based on published awards provides grounds for customers' dissatisfac-
tion with the process.
2. Explanations Unrelated to the Process
A myriad of factors unrelated to the fairness of the arbitration process itself
also could contribute to customers' negative perceptions, some of which are nec-
essarily more conjectural than others.
Investors Have Lost Money. One incontrovertible fact is that investors enter
the process after a bad investment experience in which they have lost money
and/or believe that they have been wronged by the industry. This fact is very
likely to color their perceptions in a negative way, even if they achieve an out-
come that, viewed objectively, would be considered favorable.
Unrealistic Expectations. Any attorney that represents customers knows that
many of them enter the process with unrealistic expectations. Particularly if they
relied on their broker's expertise, investors may have difficulty understanding that
167. See supra, notes 124-27 and accompanying text.
168. See generally O'Neal/Solin Study, supra note 132.
169. See generally id. In all, they examined 13,810 awards, 90% of which were from the NASD
forum, the other 10% from NYSE. Id. at 6.
170. Id. at 11.
171. Id. at 12.
172. Id. at 10.
173. See also Kondo, supra note 149 and accompanying text.
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the broker is not responsible for the loss of value in the portfolio unless he has
violated the law or breached a duty owed to the customer. 174 In addition, investors
may not realize that the applicable law in most jurisdictions is anti-investor. 175
Claimants' attorneys also may unduly inflate their clients' expectations about their
chances of success. Unless investors' attorneys provide them with a realistic as-
sessment of their chances in arbitration, investors may view any outcome less than
a full recovery as "unfair" and "biased" and judge the process accordingly.
Dissatisfaction with Attorney. Investors' perceptions of the arbitration
process are likely to be bound up with their assessment of the performance of the
attorney who represented them. We did not ask investors questions about their
attorneys since this was a survey about the SRO forum. However, if the investor
perceived that his lawyer acted unprofessionally, we can expect that this would
negatively color his experience. 76 Ultimately, this aspect of the arbitration expe-
rience is outside the control of the securities arbitration forum.
Contemporaneous Media Coverage. Customers' negative perceptions could
be fueled by what they read in the media. Indeed, 39% of customers reported they
had concerns about the fairness of the process before their claim was filed.
177
These concerns may stem from a variety of sources including media coverage.
Exploring this hypothesis, we reviewed 51 articles on customers' securities
arbitration that were printed in major newspapers between January 1, 2002 and
December 31, 2006. We determined that 46% of the articles contained objective,
neutral assessments of customer arbitration, 45% of them were critical of custom-
er arbitration, and 8% contained favorable assessments of the process. 78 Thus,
contemporaneous media coverage of securities arbitration was far more negative
than positive. Whether the media coverage's portrayal of securities arbitration
was accurate or not is somewhat inapposite; it may well have colored customers'
subjective perceptions.
The Forum Does Not Adequately Educate Investors. One fairly obvious reac-
tion to the survey findings is that the securities arbitration forum does not ade-
quately educate the users of its services, particularly investors, as to the process
and recent reforms to increase its fairness. While there can be no doubt that addi-
tional education efforts are warranted, previous investor education initiatives in a
variety of contexts have not remedied the problems they were designed to ad-
174. See generally Black & Gross, Economic Suicide, supra note 17; Black & Gross, Making It Up,
supra note 17.
175. See Jennifer O'Hare, Retail Investor Remedies under Rule 10b-5, 76 U. CINN. L. REV. 521, 521
(2008); Black & Gross, Making It Up, supra note 17, at notes 286-311 and accompanying text.
176. Unhappy investors have, in the past, contacted the authors, in their capacities as Directors (either
current or past) of a law school securities arbitration clinic, for assistance in pursuing claims against
their previous attorneys for what the investors viewed as malpractice. As a matter of policy, we decline
to represent investors in these cases.
177. See supra, Fig. 8. Thirty-nine percent of all survey participants who answered this question
shared this concern. Id.
178. Copies of the articles are on file with the authors. While our review is necessarily subjective, and
one might debate some of the categorizations, we have heard this same assessment of media coverage
from others who follow media coverage of securities arbitration.
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dress. 79 Thus, we are not optimistic that lack of knowledge is the sole explana-
tion for investors' negative perceptions nor is it the sole target for correction.
Finally, we offer two explanations suggested by the securities industry for
customers' negative perceptions, both of which we reject.
The Study's Methodology is Flawed. In its immediate response to the SICA
Report-despite the fact that SIFMA itself is a member of SICA and thus partici-
pated in and approved of the survey's design and methodology-SIFMA criti-
cized the study's methodology and thus its findings as flawed. 8° In support of its
critique, however, SIFMA offers only fuzzy math (e.g., it inaccurately reported a
10% response rate)18' and a misunderstanding of key findings (e.g., its claim that
"a large majority (58%) of persons who responded to the survey never took their
cases to a decision following an arbitration hearing" is wholly unsupported by the
raw data).1 2 We remain confident of the survey's design and methodology, sub-
ject to its limitations, as we previously described. 183
The Study's Findings are Meaningless. The Securities Industry and Financial
Markets Association's ("SIFMA") "knee-jerk" response also distances itself from
the survey's findings by discounting the importance of subjective perceptions
because, in its view, many of these perceptions are at variance with objective real-
ity.' 84 Specifically, it asserts that it has demonstrated that arbitration is faster and
less expensive than litigation and that industry arbitrators are not biased and do
not adversely affect customer wins. 185 Accordingly, it argues, the subjective per-
ceptions of less knowledgeable participants in the process should be dismissed as
"faulty and out of touch with the objective reality."'186
SIFMA has not demonstrated the objective reality that it asserts. It is true that
the duration of cases in arbitration is shorter than litigation. 87 This fact does not
conflict with some participants' perceptions that the arbitration hearings took too
long.' 88 Furthermore, SIFMA offers no recent empirical data that legal costs in
securities arbitration are less than in litigation. 89 An actual comparison would not
be easy to make. Filing and forum costs are higher in arbitration than in court, but
there may be overall cost savings through lower attorneys' fees because the dis-
covery process is more streamlined in arbitration, particularly since depositions
179. See James Fanto, We're All Capitalists Now: The Importance, Nature, Provision and Regulation
of Investor Education, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REv.105, 161-62 (1998) (doubting that SEC's investor
education efforts are likely to succeed).
180. Press Release, SIRMA Questions Middling Results, Flawed Process of SICA Survey (Feb. 6,
2008), available at http://www.sifma.org/news/62459045.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
181. Id. The actual response rate was 13%; see supra, notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
182. Id.; see supra, Fig. 11, which shows that 53% of those who answered "how the most recent
dispute was resolved" (and 57% of customers who answered the question) indicated that their most
recent dispute ended with an award after a hearing or on the papers.
183. See supra, notes 54-57 and accompany text.
184. SIFMA, The Thinking Person's Guide to Interpreting the Latest Survey on Subjective Percep-
tions of Fairness of Securities Arbitration, at 3 (Feb. 6, 2008), available at
http://www.sifma.orglregulatory/pdf/Guide-Fair-Securities-Arbitration.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2008).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 7, at App. B.
188. In fact, customers were about equally divided on this question. Thirty-six percent of customers
disagreed with the statement that hearings took too long, and 35% agreed with it. See supra, Fig. 22.
189. The only empirical evidence it cites is a study of costs for the period 20 years ago between Oct.
1, 1987 and June 30, 1988. See SIFMA White Paper, supra note 7, at 29.
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are rarely used in arbitration. Even assuming that arbitration is less expensive
than litigation, the perceptions of 49% of customers that the arbitration process
was too expensive are not at variance with the objective reality. Customers could
rationally perceive the process as too expensive, particularly if their recovery is
less than what they claimed.
The most pertinent argument made by SIFMA is its assertion that empirical
evidence establishes that industry arbitrators are not biased. SIFMA cites the
SAC Industry Arbitrator Survey' 90 in support of its assertion but does not explain
the nuanced and tentative nature of that survey's findings. More disturbingly, it
cites the bare percentages of win rates in Simplified Arbitration claims and three-
person panels for 2005 and 2006 as evidence of non-bias, without accounting for
the various factors that do not allow for unqualified comparisons between two
types of claims, all of which the SAC Industry Arbitrator Survey took into ac-
count. Again, SIFMA's "reality" is not supported by the evidence.
In our view, SIFMA's overreaction to our Report to SICA and its findings
suggests a more pernicious attempt to discount investors' opinions and obscure
the need for reform.191 Since SIFMA's stated mission includes "earning, inspiring
and upholding the public's trust in the industry....,' ' 92 it is puzzling that SIFMA
uncritically champions a system that many investors perceive as unfair and that
contributes to distrust of the industry. Strategically, SIFMA apparently has de-
cided that unconditional support for the current system is the best tactic to oppose
the proposed legislation eliminating mandatory consumer arbitration. Thus,
SIFMA identified as a "key project" for 2008 the defense of "pre-dispute agree-
ments to arbitrate in the SRO-sponsored forum,"' 193 it testified in Congress against
the application of the Arbitration Fairness Act to securities arbitration, 194 and the
SIFMA White Paper is largely a promotion piece for what it describes as "the
success story of an investor protection focused institution that has delivered time-
ly, cost-effective, and fair results for over 30 years."' 195 While we agree with
SIFMA that securities arbitration cannot usefully be compared to "some idealized,
utopian version" of litigation, 96 we reject the assertion that investors' perceptions
of the securities arbitration system should not be taken into account in reforming
the process.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the underlying explanations, we have no doubt that our survey re-
sults are illuminating as to subjective perceptions by arbitration participants of
fairness, albeit inconclusive as to objective standards of fairness. As stated
above,197 subjective perceptions are important because participants' views of fair-
190. See supra, note 144 and accompanying text.
191. In contrast, FINRA-the forum itself- does not mandate that investors arbitrate their industry
disputes.
192. SLFMA, SJFMA Mission, http://www.sifma.org/.
193. SIFMA, 2008 Key Projects, http://www.sifma.orglabout/pdf/keyProjects.pdf.
194. See generally Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 6 (SIFMA Testimony).
195. SIFMA White Paper, supra note 7, at cover page.
196. See Senate Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 6 (SIFMA Testimony), at 5.
197. See supra, Part II (B).
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ness, particularly procedural fairness, are critical to the integrity of the dispute
resolution process.1 98 Yet, as our survey has found, customers have an unfavora-
ble overall impression of securities arbitration even though, in their most recent
experience, they report largely favorable impressions of arbitrator competence and
attentiveness. Thus, the perceived lack of neutrality of the panel and the lack of
transparency heavily contribute to the negative impressions of the process.
Simply put, even if the system meets objective standards of fairness, a man-
datory system that is not perceived as doing so cannot maintain the confidence of
its users and, in the long run, may not be sustainable. As a result, customers'
negative perceptions are changing the realities of the current system of securities
arbitration and require a re-thinking by policy-makers.
Accordingly, based on the findings of our Report, we urge the SEC and
FINRA to give serious consideration to eliminating the requirement of an industry
arbitrator on every three-person arbitration panel.' 99 Rightly or wrongly, investors
are simply suspicious of a mandatory process with an opaque outcome that is
sponsored by the regulatory arm of the securities industry and that includes an
industry representative on every three-arbitrator panel hearing a claim greater than
$25,000. The frequently-made argument - that no one can prove that the presence
of an industry arbitrator harms the investor - misses the point. Given the wide-
spread distrust of the industry arbitrator, it would seem that the presence of an
industry arbitrator would have to contribute great value to the process-which no
one can establish either-to justify the continuation of this practice. 2°° We are
less convinced about the value of requiring arbitrators to explain their awards at
the request of the customer, because of the dangers it will lead to more attempts to
vacate awards and thus prolong the arbitration process. However, based on our
findings, and as discussed above,2°' we believe that this proposed reform should
be revisited.
As longtime observers of securities arbitration, we continue to believe that it
is a better alternative to litigation. Nevertheless, the survey's findings are trouble-
some. Despite FINRA's commendable efforts to improve the process, these ef-
forts will likely prove unsuccessful in winning customers' confidence so long as
they are required to accept both an industry arbitrator and an unexplained award.
198. See supra, notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
199. We have no preconceived notion of the best way to accomplish this and believe this should be
the subject of public discussion and debate. For example, the current composition of the panel could
remain the default rule, but customers could be allowed to opt out of the requirement of the industry
arbitrator. Indeed, this appears to be the approach of FINRA's recently launched pilot program to
provide customers with unlimited strikes for arbitrators in the "non-public" list. See FINRA, Notices to
Parties, Public Arbitrator Pilot Program Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.finra.org/ArbitrationMediation/Parties/ArbitrationProcess/NoticesToParties/P 116995.
Alternatively, the inclusion of an industry arbitrator on every three-person panel could be permitted if
both parties agreed to it. Most radically, the distinction between industry and public arbitrators could
be eliminated, and parties would select the arbitrators that they believe have the preferred background
and experience for deciding their case.
200. FINRA's Public Arbitrator Pilot Program will allow customers in eligible cases to strike all
industry arbitrators and end up with an all-public panel. See supra, note 192. Certainly this is a step
forward, but we are dubious that it is the panacea that will alleviate these concerns. The program does
not apply to all cases and does not have the longevity and commitment of a permanent rule proposal.
We are particularly concerned that FINRA's pilot program will distract attention from investor advo-
cates' pleas to permanently eliminate the industry arbitrator.
201. See supra, notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
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While SIFMA's dismissive and patronizing response to customers appears to be
"get over it," we submit that this is not a helpful response. Rather, in light of
these findings of customers' dissatisfaction and perceptions of unfairness, the
indisputable reality is that it is incumbent upon regulators, the forum, and the
industry to work toward further improvements in the system. We believe that
these suggested reforms may help to improve investors' perceptions and obviate
the need for Congressional action.
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RE: Securities Arbitration Fairness Survey - 2007
Dear <<PREFIX>> <<LAST_NAME>>:
Over the past twenty years, arbitration has become the primary method of re-
solving disputes in the securities industry. Recently, a report to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) recommended independent research to evaluate the
fairness of securities arbitration.
The Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), a group created
with the encouragement of the SEC and made up of representatives of securities
regulators, the securities industry and public investors, has commissioned the Pace
Investor Rights Project (affiliated with Pace University School of Law) to conduct
a survey to evaluate the fairness of the arbitration of customer claims at both
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"). This survey has been developed with our input and support, and will
be administered through Cornell University's Survey Research Institute. Our
mission is to study whether participants believe the securities arbitration process is
conducted simply, fairly, economically and without bias by the arbitrators.
We need YOUR participation and feedback. You are receiving this survey
because NASD or NYSE records show that you were involved in a dispute that
was filed for arbitration in its forum in the last five years. Please take a few mi-
nutes to complete the questionnaire below and return it in the self-addressed post-
age-paid return envelope provided. Please be assured that your responses will be
kept completely confidential and will never be used in any way to permit identifi-
cation of you. Your responses will be used only in aggregate form. We hope that
you will complete and return it as soon as possible.
We greatly appreciate your cooperation. If you have any questions, please do
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The Pace Investor Rights Project (affiliated with Pace University School of Law) is
conducting this survey for the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration (SICA), a
group created with the encouragement of the United States Securities and Exchange
Commission and made up of representatives of securities regulators, the Securities Industry
Association and public investors.
The purpose of this survey is to evaluate the fairness of the arbitration of customer claims
at both NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. ("NASD") and the New York Stock Exchange
('NYSE"). Our mission is to study whether participants believe the securities arbitration
process is conducted simply, fairly, economically and without bias by the arbitrators. We
need YOUR participation and feedback to accomplish this mission.
You are receiving this questionnaire because NASD or NYSE records show that you were
involved in a dispute between a customer and a brokerage firm and/or its registered
representative(s) ("associated person(s)") filed for arbitration in its fornm in the last five
years. Please take a few minutes to complete the questionnaire below and return it in the
self-addressed postage-paid return envelope provided. Please be assured that our responses
will be kept completely confidential and will never be used in any way to permit
identification of you. Your responses will be used only in aggregate form.
If you have been involved in more than one such dispute in the last five years, please
answer the questions below by focusing on the MOST RECENT dispute that resulted in an
arbitration award following a live or paper hearing.
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PLEASE READ THESE INSTRUCTIONS CAREFULLY
* Please fill in the oval next to your answer completely using blue or black ink.
Example: Fill in ovals completely, like this: &
Not like this: W Or this: <0
Please follow any instructions that direct you to the next question.
Example: D No -,,1- Go to Question 3.
* If you mark an answer with a line after it, please write the specific information on the
line.
Example:
Other, please specify: ja s me
* Mark only one response for each question, unless other instructions are given.
1. In the past five years, have you been Involved In a dispute between a customer and a securities
brokerage firm and/or its registered represantative(s) ('assodated person(s)") that was flied for
arbitration before NASD or the NYSE?
o Yes, I was involved as a customer. -N Go to Question 2.
0 Yes, I was involved as acorporate representative of a securities brokerage firm. -1 Go to Queston 2.
o Yes, I was involved as an associated person of a brokerage fhnt -- Go to Question 2.
o Yes, I was involved as a lawyer or other representative of a party. -*Go to Question 3.
o No, I was not involved in any such dispute. -0 STOP. Do not continue with this survey, but please
mall It back In postage paid envelope.
2. Were you represented by a lawyer In that dispute? (If you were Involved In more than one such
dispute, answer with resped to the most recent one.)
o Yes, I was represented by a lawyer.
o Yes, I was represented by a lawye trough a law school clinic.
o No, I chose to represent myself because I did not want to be represented.
o No, I represeated myself because Icould not afford to retain a lawyer.
o No, I represented myself because I could not find a lawyer to represent me.
o No, I was represented by a non-lawyer.
For those who answered Question 2, please go to Question 5.
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3. (Lawyers/Representatives only) In the past five years, how many disputes between a customer and a
securities brokerage firm and/or Its registered representative(s) ("associated person(s)") that were
flied for arbitration before NASD or the NYSE were you Involved in?
0 I have been involved in only one such dispute, and I represented (select all that apply):
o the customer.
o the brokerage firm.
o the associated person.
Go to Question 6a.
o I have been involved in more than one such dispute.
4a. Overall, In the past five years, have you primarily represented customers or securities Industry parties
In these disputes?
O I primarilyrepresentedcustomers.
o 1 primarily representedregistered representatives associatedpersns."
o I primarily represented the brokerage firm
o Do not know/Do not recall
4b. In the most recent of these disputes, whom did you represent (select all that apply)?
o The customer
o The brokerage firm
0 The associated person




o More than 10
0 Do not know/Do not recall
6a. Did the customer agreement In the most recent dispute contain a clause requiring the parties to resolve
that dispute through arbitration?
0 Yes -+ Go to Question 6b.
o No -0 Go to Question 7.
o DonotknowDonotrecall CGo to Question 7.




0 Do not know/Do not recall
7. What was the nrimarv reason this dispute was filed In an arbitration forum?
o Believed arbitration would be faster than comrt
o Believed arbitration would be less expensive thancout.
0 Believed arbitration would be more fair than court.
0 Believed arbitration would provide a larger recovery than court.
o Believed arbitration was required.
o Preferred arbitration for other reasons.
o A lawyer recormmded it.
0 Did not initiate the claim.
0 Do not know/Do not recall
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8. Before the most recent dispute was filed In arbitration, did you have concerns about the securitles
arbitration forum? (select all that apply)
o No, I bad no concerns.
o Yes, I was concerned that it would be expensive.
o Yes, I was concerned that it would be a slow process.
o Yes, I was concerned that it would not be a fair process.
o Yes, I was concerned about the composition of the arbitration panel.
o Yes, I was concerned that the arbitrators would be biased.
o Yes, Ihad other concerns.
o I do not recall if I had any concems.
9. With respect to your most recent dispute, In what state was the hearing scheduled to take place? (If
the dispute was a Simplified Arbitration that took place on the papers, write "paper ease.")
10. What was the approximate anount of damages (excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, Interest
and costs) claimed In this most recent dispute?
O Not exceeding $25,000
o $25,001 - $50,000
0$50,001 - $100,000
o $101,000 - $250,000
o $250,001 - $1,000,o0
o More than $1,000,000
o Do not know/Do not recall
11. How was this most recent dispute resolved?
o The asbitration panel issued an award of damages to the customer after alive hearing.
o The arbitration panel issued an award of damages to the customer based on written Go to Question 12a.
submissions (a "paper"case).
o The claimant voluntarily withdrew the claim.
O The parties settled the claim on their own.
o The parties settled the claim with the aid of a mediator.
o The arbitration panel did not award damages to the customer based on written Go to Queion 13.
submissions (a "paper"case).
O The arbitration panel dismissed the casebefore a live hearing began.
o The arbitration panel did not award damages to the customer after a live hearing.
o Do not know/Do not recall
12a. What was the approximate amount of the total award In this most recent dispute?
0 $1.00- 10,000
0 $10,001 - 5000
o $50,001 - 250,000
o $250,001 - 1,000,000
o More than $1,000,000
o Do not know/Do not recall
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12b. What percentage of damages (excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, Interest and costs)
originally claimed does this represent?
oLess than I 0 50-74
01-10 o 75-990 11-25 0 100
0 26-49 o Do not know/Do not recl
13. How many arbitrators were appointed to decide this dispute?
0 Three - Go to Question 14a.
o One -1 Go to Question 15.
o No arbitrators were appointed. -* Go to Question 16.
0 Do not know/Do not recall -.0 Go to Question 16.
14a. Did you know, prior to the filing of the arbitration, that one arbitrator would be connected in some




14b. Did you know, at any time during the dispute, which arbitrator was the industry arbitrator and
which arbitrators were public arbitrators?
0 Yes
O No
0 Do not recall




0 There was no opporttmity to assess the performance of the arbitrators.
0 Do not know/Do not recall
14d. Would you say that the Industry arbitrator favored one side over the other at any time during the
dispute?
o No
o Yes, the industry arbitrator favored the customer.
0 Yes, the industry arbitrator favored at least one securities industry party.
0 There was no opportunity to assess whether the arbitrators favored any party.
a Do not know/Do not recall
14e. Was the award unanimous?
0 Yes
0 No
0 Do not know/Do not recall
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15. Would you say that any public arbitrator favored one side over the other at any time during the
dispute?
o No
o Yes, a public arbitrator favored the customer.
o Yes, a public arbitrator favored at least one securities industry party.
o There was no opportunity to assess whether the arbitrator favored any party.
o Do not know/Do not recall
Based on your experiences In the MOST RECENT dispute In which you were Involved that was filed for
arbitration before NASD or the NYSE. please Indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the
following statements. If your dispute did not progress enough to enable you to evaluate the statement,
select "Not Applicable." Please answer these questions, to the extent they apply, even If your dispute did
not progress to a hearing. Nethe
Srontly Agree or trongly Nol Dont
Agree Agree Disagre Disagree Disag Applical Know
16. The arbitration panel appeared competent to o
resolve the dispute.
17. The arbitration panel did not understand the a a a o Q a
issues involved in the ease.
18. The arbitration panel was open-minded. a a a a a o a
19. The arbitration panel was impartial. 0 0 0 0 0 a 0
20. The arbitration panel appeared competent to
resolve pre-hearing issues.
21. The discovery process enabled me to obtain the
information needed for a hearing. 0 a a a 0 0 0
22. Thm arbitration hearings took too long. 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
23. At the hearing, the arbitration panel listened to o o o o o
the parties, their representatives and their witnesses.
24. At the hearing, the arbitration panel understood 0 a a 0 a
the legal arguments in the case.
25. At the hearing, the arbitration panel did not provide
a sufficient amount of time for the parties to present 0 0 a 0 0
their evidence.
26. At the hearing, the arbitration panal did not
provide a sufficient amount of time for the a 0 a a 0 0 a
parties to argue the merits of their case.
27. l am satisfied with the outcome. 0 0 o 0 a o 0
28. 1 would be more satisfied if I had an explanation 0 0 0 0 0 0
of the award.
29. The outcome was not very different from ny 0 0 0 0 0 0
initial expectations.
30. The arbitration process was too expensive. o 0 a o 0 0 0
31. The arbitration panel did not apply the law to 0 o 0 o o a o
decide the dispute.
32. 1 would recomsend to others that they use o o 0 o o o o
arbitration to resolve their securities disputes.
33. 1 have a favorable view of securities arbitration
for customer disputes. a a a a a a a
34. As a whole, I feel that the arbitration process was
fair.
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35. In the last fIe years, have you ever been a party or represented a party In at least one dvil court
case (not Involving a criminal, matrimonial or custodlal matter and excluding dass action lawsuits)?
(select all that apply)
oNo -- Go to Question 36.
o Yes, I was a plaintiff.
o Yes. I represented a plaintiff.
o Yes, I was a defendant.
o Yes. I represented a defeadant.
o Do not know/Do not recall
35a. Focusing on your most recent experience In a dill court case, how dferent do you think your result
from the arbitration would have been had it proceeded in court?
o Veaydiffereat
o A littledifferent
o Exactly the same
o Do not know






o Do not know
36. Based on your experiences In one or more securities arbitration customer disputes, ff you had the
choice, would you choose arbitration to resolve a customer dispute In the future? (select all that apply)
o Yes, I would choose arbitration over corta
o No, I would not choose arbitration became the process is not fair.
o No, I would not choose arbitration because the process is more expensive than court.
o No, I would not choose arbitration because the process takes more time than court.
o No, I would not choose arbitration because the arbitrators are not competent to resolve
customer-broker diSputes.
o Irm not sore.
o None of the above.
37. Are you familiar with changes that the securities arbitration forums have made to their procedural
rules In the last five years?
o Yes, I think the changes have made the process fairer.
o Yes, Ithink thechanges have not made a difference.
o Yes. I think the changes have made the process less fair.
o No, I am not familiar with the changes.
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Disagree Strongly DonDisaze Know
a. simple for all parties involved o 0 a 0
b. fair to all parties involved a 0 0 0 0 0
c. economical 0 0 0 a 0 a
d. without bias 0 a 0 0 a
THANK YOU FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION!
Please return this survey in the postage-paid envelope
provided, or mail it to:
Survey Research Institute
Cornell University
391 Pine Tree Rd., Ri. 118
Ithaca, NY 14850
IlIEHIlMllI "
38. Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the following statements.
In your opintoD, do you believe that the securities arbitration process is conducted by the
arbitrators In a way that Is:
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